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COMMENT
Hard Ball, Soft Law in MLB:
Who Died and Made WADA the Boss?
GEORGE T. STIEFEL IIIt
INTRODUCTION
If you have read a newspaper or watched the news
within the last five years, you have probably drawn an
immediate association between steroids and Major League
Baseball (MLB). Even though MLB had a policy banning
the use of steroids, "the use of steroids in [M\ILB] was
widespread."' Many people have voiced the view that the
use of certain performance-enhancing drugs in professional
sports is intolerable. 2 Conventional wisdom suggests that
t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, Class of
2009; B.S. Clarkson University. I would like to thank my parents for their
continued support. I would also like to thank my family, friends, teachers,
professors, and scout leaders for their guidance throughout the years. Much of
the success I have achieved can be attributed to the influence and inspiration
that each of you has provided through leading by example.
1. GEORGE J. MITCHELL, DLA PIPER US LLC, REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER
OF BASEBALL OF AN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE ILLEGAL USE OF
STEROIDS AND OTHER PERFORMANCE ENHANCING SUBSTANCES BY PLAYERS IN
MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL SR-35 (2007), http://files.mlb.com/mitchrpt.pdf.
2. See Brent D. Showalter, Steroid Testing Policies in Professional Sports:
Regulated by Congress or the Responsibility of the Leagues?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L.
REV. 651, 661 (2007) (discussing bills introduced in Congress in 2005 and noting
1225
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MLB needs to crack down on performance-enhancing drug
use with a strict policy that carries severe sanctions. 3 This
Comment proposes that "soft law" can help MLB "get
tough" without jeopardizing the fundamental American
values that other solutions are willing to sacrifice.
In response to the steroid controversy, various non-
governmental organizations have acted in ways that
required them to balance competing private interests-such
as health and fair play against the privacy rights of
individuals-and there has been a seemingly inconsistent
battle between the 'integrity of the game"' and the
"integrity of [the] legal system."4 In today's world, sports-
even baseball, America's national pastime-have become
subject to international influences and constraints. 5 The
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has developed an
the common justifications for these bills were to protect the .'integrity and
value of sports and . . . reduc[e] performance enhancing [drug] use by youth"
(quoting COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, DRUG FREE SPORTS ACT, H.R. REP.
No. 109-210, pt. 1, at 4 (2005))); David M. Wachutka, Comment, Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports: The Proper Forum for
Establishing Performance-Enhancing Drug Testing Policies, 8 PEPP. DIsP.
RESOL. L.J. 147, 150 (2007) ("Major League Baseball's records for the most home
runs hit in a single season, and for the most home runs hit in a career, are
arguably the most cherished records in sports .... Since 1998, the mark set by
Maris [in 1961] has been surpassed [six times] .... The breaking of this historic
record brought the issue of performance-enhancing drugs into the public
spotlight. Baseball fans rejected the idea of unnatural players breaking historic
records and tarnishing the integrity of America's pastime.").
3. See, e.g., Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 81, 88 (Jan. 20, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html ("So tonight
I call on team owners, union representatives, coaches, and players to take the
lead, to send the right signal, to get tough, and to get rid of steroids now.").
4. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915, 979
(9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part), withdrawn and reh'g granted,
513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008); cf. Elizabeth Rocco, Note, "Inequality in the
Game" vs. "Inequality in the Legal System The Constitutionality of Searches
and Seizures in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 15 VILL. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 33 (2008) (discussing whether the government violated the Fourth
Amendment when it seized data from the laboratory that conducted drug
testing for MLB).
5. Cf. Jeffrey P. Gleason, Comment, From Russia with Love: The Legal
Repercussions of the Recruitment and Contracting of Foreign Players in the
National Hockey League, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 599, 600 (2008) ("[P]rofessional sports
have followed the same path as nations, individuals, and economies in taking on
an increasingly international character, one that no longer exists solely in
Olympic competition.").
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international code, the World Anti-Doping Code (the Code),
to control performance-enhancing drugs in sports and
harmonize drug testing internationally. WADA, Congress,
the media, and fans have placed pressure on MLB to adopt
policies that conform to the stringent standards of the Code.
Congress has held several hearings and has considered
passing legislation to regulate performance-enhancing drug
testing in professional sports. On the other hand, others
have advocated for respect of the collective bargaining
process and our free-market economy. The Mitchell Report,
a private investigation on the use of performance-enhancing
drugs in MLB, took a position somewhere in the middle by
recognizing that the MLB Players Association (MLBPA) has
a right to control drug testing through the collective
bargaining process, but maintaining that the program
needs to be "independent."
This Comment explores the influence that WADA has
had on MLB's steroid policy. Throughout this exploration,
this Comment seeks to address two questions. First, why is
WADA the authoritative figure in this area? In other words,
who died and made WADA "the boss"? Second, would it be
feasible and effective for MLB to sign the code? Part I
discusses the history and policies of MLB and WADA. Part
II discusses a field of study in the context of international
law that has been coined "soft law." Part III addresses legal
pluralism and how multiple legal actors coexist. Part IV
proposes that a soft law agreement with an independent
actor would improve MLB's performance-enhancing drug
policy without implicating the sovereignty costs and legal
concerns associated with signing the Code or becoming
regulated by federal legislation.6
While exploring many of the proposed solutions to the
steroid crisis, this Comment references some constitutional
protections. While the Constitution may not directly apply
6. Cf. Robyn R. Goldstein, Comment, An American in Paris: The Legal
Framework of International Sport and the Implications of the World Anti-
Doping Code on Accused Athletes, 7 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 149, 168 (2007) ("In
the end, the Code must find a balance to provide both a rigorous testing system,
while also protecting the rights of the individual athletes. At least one athlete
has argued that there must be adherence to the 'fundamental moral code that
protects human rights in a democratic society,' so that the bureaucracy of sport




to the circumstances because of issues such as state action,
the fundamental rights contained in the Bill of the Rights
represent principles and values that are at the core of
American society and should be respected accordingly. The
Constitution should, at the very least, be a persuasive
authority in these circumstances. By noting certain
constitutional principles, this Comment hopes to spur
public discourse that is cognizant of the rights which are at
stake-even if they are not implicated in a pure legal sense.
In reading this Comment, please keep the following
hypothetical situation in mind, without attempting to
assert technical defenses: Suppose you are attending a local
little league game and, to combat rowdy and overzealous
parents from dampening the spirit of the game for the
young athletes, one of the team's coaches requires all
parents in attendance to submit to a drug and alcohol test
to ensure they are not under the influence of alcohol or
drugs which could impair their judgment and cause them to
ridicule the opposing team, the umpires, or the coaches.
Would you eagerly hold out your arm for a blood sample?
Would it be justified if the intent was to prevent the
parents from embarrassing themselves? Will our eagerness
to subject MLB players to drug testing have repercussions,
such as indicating that society no longer has a reasonable
expectation of privacy when it comes to drug testing? While
WADA's goal of global integration is laudable, this
Comment argues that the cost of effective anti-doping
regulation does not have to be the values that lie at the core
of our Constitution.
While MLB has received much criticism in the media,
this Comment actually calls upon MLB for action because
MLB and the MLBPA have recently demonstrated that
they are more committed than other American professional
sports in their ambition to eliminate performance-
enhancing drugs from their sport. In response to the
Mitchell Report and coercion from Congress, MLB and the
MLBPA have agreed to reform their performance-
enhancing drug policy in ways similar to the proposal in
this Comment. If anything, this Comment should be
interpreted as advocating for WADA to change its ways, to
become more cognizant of American values, and to establish
a system that is respectful of the diverse circumstances that
exist in different sports leagues by focusing on coordination,
rather than harmonization.
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I. THE "PLAYERS"
The major organizations in the performance-enhancing
drug policy debate are WADA and American professional
sports leagues. The inherent differences in the structure of
American professional sports leagues and WADA have
played a significant role in the performance-enhancing drug
policies these organizations have been able to implement. 7
While WADA was formed through the Olympic Movement
and has been accepted by various national governments
through their ratification of international declarations,
athletes in the four major American professional sports
leagues are unionized employees. The players' unions
negotiate, on behalf of the players, with the league and
team owners over the terms and conditions of
employment-which is called collective bargaining. The end
result of this process is a collective bargaining agreement.
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) governs the
collective bargaining process. 8  The National Labor
Relations Board has held that drug testing of employees is
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 9
A. MLB
MLB's performance-enhancing drug policies have
received much attention and scrutiny from Congress and
the public. Prior to 2002, when the Bay Area Laboratory
Cooperative (BALCO) investigation began, 10 the MLBPA
refused to collectively bargain over a mandatory random
drug testing policy on the basis that it "invaded the players'
7. See, e.g., Allan H. "Bud" Selig with Robert D. Manfred, Jr., The
Regulation of Nutritional Supplements in Professional Sports, 15 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REv. 35, 44-48 (2004). Indeed, in 2001, the Commissioner unilaterally
imposed mandatory random drug testing throughout MLB's minor league
system, which is not unionized. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 42-46.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000); see, e.g., Am. League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs,
180 N.L.R.B. 190, 192 (1969).
9. Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. 180, 182 (1989). In addition, MLB
arbitrators have recognized that drug testing for any substance is a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 3.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 190-93.
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privacy and 'was an abuse of human rights.""'1 While the
owners and Commissioners proposed drug testing programs
prior to 2002, they gave the issue "lower priority in
bargaining than economic issues."12
However, contrary to popular belief, MLB historically
had some tools to combat performance-enhancing drug use.
In 1971, MLB promulgated a written policy that prohibited
the use, possession, or distribution of any prescription
medication without a valid prescription; however, the
primary focus of this policy was "drugs of abuse," such as
cocaine, as opposed to performance-enhancing drugs, such
as steroids. 13 This policy required that baseball personnel
comply with federal and state drugs laws. 14 In 1991,
steroids were expressly incorporated in MLB's drug policy
when the Anabolic Steroids Control Act of 1990 reclassified
anabolic steroids as a Schedule III controlled substance. 15
In addition, the MLB Commissioner has had broad
power under the "best interest of the league" clause in the
league's official rules, which grants him or her with the
power to take any actions that are in the "best interest" of
the sport. 16 This authority does not extend to matters that
are related to the collective bargaining process, such as
imposing mandatory random drug testing. 17 Under this
11. Showalter, supra note 2, at 658 (quoting Barry M. Bloom, Mandatory
Steroid Testing to Begin, MLB.com, Nov. 13, 2003, http://mlb.mlb.comnews/
article.jsp?ymd=20031113&content id=603458&vkey-newsmlb&fext=.jsp&c-i
d=mlb).
12. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at SR-3.
13. See id. at SR-10, 18, 25-27.
14. Id. at 27 (citing Memorandum from Major League Baseball Office of the
Comm'r to Admin. Officials of Major League Baseball Re: Drug Educ. and
Prevention Program 2 (Apr. 5, 1971)).
15. Id. at 18, 41.
16. Id. at 1.
17. The Commissioner's authority under this power was further limited
under the Ferguson Jenkins arbitration decision in 1980. Id. at 29-30. Jenkins,
a MLB player, was arrested in Canada for possession of marijuana, hashish,
and cocaine, and was subsequently suspended by the Commissioner for
declining to cooperate with the Commissioner's investigation. Id. at 29. The
MLBPA challenged the suspension and the arbitration panel overturned it,
holding that neither an arrest nor the refusal to comply with an internal
investigation provided "just cause" for the suspension. Id. at 29-30. The panel
held that Jenkins must be presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the
1230 [Vol. 56
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power, the Commissioner has had the authority to
discipline players for "just cause" based on non-analytical
evidence-evidence of a violation other than a positive test
result-of the possession, use, or distribution of prohibited
drugs.' 8 However, prior to 2002, no player was ever
disciplined for steroid use. 19
Since 1984, MLB has also had a limited drug testing
policy when there was "reason to believe" a player was
using drugs of abuse. 20 This program did not expressly
include steroids or amphetamines on the schedule of
prohibited substances and, in addition, a three-member
arbitration panel had to unanimously determine whether
reasonable cause existed. 21 Apparently, in practice, the
arbitration panel was not used and testing was conducted
merely after consent from the MLBPA, but this policy was
"informal and unwritten. '' 22 Because the policy required
consent of the MLBPA or an arbitration ruling, tests were
administered long after evidence of use was discovered,
which gave players advance notice that testing might
occur. 23 As a condition of its consent, the MLBPA generally
required that the testing be kept "strictly confidential," that
no discipline be imposed for a first positive test, and that
the Commissioner's Office forfeit its investigatory interview
internal investigation was "compelling Jenkins to jeopardize his defense in
court." Id. at 30. Three years later, in 1983, the Commissioner suspended three
players for a full year without pay who pled guilty to misdemeanor cocaine
possession. Id. at 31-32. The MLBPA filed a grievance on behalf of two of the
players, and the arbitrators stated that "[tIraditional notions of industrial
discipline support the conclusion that an employer may respond to drug-related
misconduct with severe measures" and held that '"just cause' existed for a
suspension," but a one-year suspension was "too severe to be squared with the
just-cause requirement." Id. at 32.
18. Id. at SR-11, -34.
19. Id. at SR-11. Since 2002, MLB has used this non-analytical positive
system (finding a violation without having a positive drug test) to discipline
players. See id. at SR-13 to -16. For example, Jason Grimsley was suspended
after admitting to federal investigators that he used steroids and human
growth hormone (HGH). Id. at SR-13 to -14.
20. Id. at 34-35, 47-50.
21. Id. at 34.
22. Id. at 47.
23. Id. at 25-26, 48.
2008] 1231
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rights used to discipline players based on non-analytical
evidence. 2
4
In 2002, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
finally included mandatory random drug testing. 25 Other
than the amendments discussed below, this policy is the
most current collective bargaining agreement between MLB
and the MLBPA. The policy prohibits the use, possession,
distribution, or sale of numerous substances, including all
steroids listed on Schedule III of the Controlled Substances
Act and any substances subsequently added to Schedules II
and III of the Controlled Substances Act. 26 The policy also
allows players to be interviewed by baseball officials about
the alleged use of performance-enhancing drugs, but the
MLBPA is entitled to advance notice and has resisted
efforts to interview players. 27
The 2002 CBA did not originally provide for permanent,
random drug testing. Instead, MLB and the MLBPA agreed
to a policy that would implement "survey testing" for
2003.28 Each player was tested twice and there were no
punishments for a positive test; however, "[i]f more than
five percent of players tested positive, then mandatory
testing for the following seasons would be implemented
until positive tests were under two and one-half percent in
consecutive years. ' 29 In the 2003 season, between five and
seven percent of the players tested positive, and mandatory
testing was implemented during the 2004 season.30 In 2005,
MLB and the MLBPA voluntarily agreed to modify the
performance-enhancing drug policy on two separate
occasions. 31 The first modification provided that all players
would be subjected to random testing for forty-five
substances at least once during the season.32 It also
provided that the penalties for a positive test of steroids
24. Id. at 48.
25. Id. at 53.
26. Id. at 54.
27. Id. at 87.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Showalter, supra note 2, at 658; see also MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 54.
30. Showalter, supra note 2, at 658.
31. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 57-58; Showalter, supra note 2, at 659.
32. Showalter, supra note 2, at 659.
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included a ten day suspension for the first violation, a
thirty day suspension for the second, a sixty-day suspension
for the third, and a one year suspension for the fourth. 33
Based on the second set of modifications in 2005, MLB's
current policy tests all players for steroids and
amphetamines once during spring training and at least
once during the season. 34 In addition, random testing on an
individual can occur at any time during the season and out-
of-season. 35 However, the aggregate number of tests is
limited.36 The first positive test for steroids results in a fifty
game suspension (approximately 31% of the 162 game
season), one hundred games for the second (62% of the
season), and a lifetime ban for the third positive test.37
In March 2006, MLB hired former Senate Majority
Leader George Mitchell to conduct an investigation on the
use of performance-enhancing drugs in baseball. 38 Mitchell
and others spent over a year and a half conducting
interviews and collecting evidence related to use of
performance-enhancing drugs in MLB with the goal of
making conclusions as to the cause(s) of this epidemic and
making recommendations. 39 Senator Mitchell concluded
that MLB's anti-performance-enhancing drug policy since
2002, as amended, has been effective for detectable
substances, but still falls short of current best practices in
testing.40 The Mitchell Report recommended that MLB
improve its policy in three principal ways: (1) by vigorously
investigating the use of performance-enhancing drugs
through non-analytical evidence, enhancing cooperation
with law enforcement authorities, and establishing a
department of investigations; (2) by improving the player
education program; and (3) by implementing a "state-of-the-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 659-60; see also MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 267.
35. Showalter, supra note 2, at 660.
36. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 267.
37. Showalter, supra note 2, at 660.
38. ESPN.com, Mitchell Report Due to be Released Next Week, ESPN, Dec. 7,
2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3145958.
39. Id. For a more detailed explanation of the goals and process of the
investigation, see MITCHELL, supra note 1, at SR-5 to -7.
40. See MITCHELL, supra note 1, at SR-1, -23.
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art drug testing program. ' 41 Senator Mitchell criticized the
MLB program for not providing the program administrator
with enough independence. 42 Under the 2002 joint drug
program, the program was administered by a "Health
Policy Advisory Committee" of four people-with the
Commissioner's Office and the MLBPA each appointing two
representatives. 43  In Senator Mitchell's opinion, the
administrator needs to be given exclusive authority over the
program's structure and administration. 44 The Mitchell
Report notes that MLB and the MLBPA should give up
control over: (1) the number of tests administered; (2)
determination of what substances are prohibited; (3)
selection and retention of entities responsible for collecting
and testing samples; (4) determination to order "reasonable
cause" testing; (5) investigating and determining whether a
test is considered positive; and (6) the administrator or
administrating body should not be able to be removed
except for good cause. 45
In the wake of the Mitchell Report, the Commissioner
implemented all recommendations, most notably, the
enhanced department of investigations, which could be
unilaterally implemented.46 MLB and the MLBPA
subsequently agreed to re-open the CBA and amend their
anti-doping policy to increase the frequency of testing and
the authority of the program's independent administrator.47
Under these amendments to the Joint Drug Program, the
parties agreed to disband the Health Policy Advisory
41. Id. at 285-86. The Mitchell Report notes that the recommendations
related to the investigations and educational programs can be unilaterally
implemented by the Commissioner; however, the recommendations related to
the testing program are subject to the CBA, upon which the parties would have
to agree to reopen negotiations. Id.
42. Id. at 263-64.
43. Id. at 263.
44. Id. at SR-31.
45. See id. at 264, 303-04.
46. Press Release, Major League Baseball, MLB Establishes Department of
Investigations (Jan. 11, 2008), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/pressreleases!
press-release.jsp?ymd=200801 1 1&contentid=2343802&vkey-pr mlb&fext=.js
p&cid=mlb.
47. Press Release, Major League Baseball, MLB, Players Association Modify
Joint Drug Agreement (Apr. 11, 2008), http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/
releases/releases.jsp?content=041108a.
1234 [Vol. 56
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Committee and appoint an individual with the title
"Independent Program Administrator" (IPA).48 The IPA
was appointed for a three-year term and "can be removed
only if an independent arbitrator confirms that he has acted
in a manner inconsistent with the Program or has engaged
in other misconduct that affects his ability to function as
the IPA."49 The IPA has authority to issue an annual report
summarizing aggregate details of the testing process, audit
test results, review performance of the collection company
and laboratory, conduct up to 375 off-season tests over the
three-year term, and develop a mandatory educational
program in consultation with the league and the MLBPA.50
The IPA is also part of an "annual review process" along
with the league, the MLBPA, the collection company, and
the laboratory.5 1 MLB believes these modifications provide
sufficient independence, transparency, and flexibility.52
MLB and the MLBPA also agreed to increase the amount of
testing and added to the list of prohibited substances. 53
Even after these amendments, however, some experts have
argued that even though "Major League Baseball's new
anti-doping agreement.. . is arguably the strongest testing
program in professional sports .... [O]n the day it [went]
into effect, it already [was] all but obsolete." 54
B. The Olympics and WADA
In the 1950s, the International Olympic Committee
(IOC) recognized a problem with doping and passed a
48. Id. Dr. Smith, who was part of the Health Policy Advisory Committee,




52. Press Release, Major League Baseball, Joint Drug Agreement Addresses
Mitchell Recommendations (Apr. 11, 2008), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/
pressjreleases/press-release.jsp?ymd=20080411&contentid=2515767&vkey=pr
_mlb&fext=.jsp&cid=mlb.
53. Press Release, supra note 47.
54. T.J. Quinn & Mark Fainaru-Wada, U.S. Pro Sports Leagues Still Trail
in Drug-Testing Arms Race, ESPN, May 23, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/
espn/print?id=3408399&type=story (discussing blood testing and longitudinal
analysis, or a blood sample "passport," but noting that "[b]oth USADA's pilot
and WADA's system are untested in court and unquestionably invasive").
2008] 1235
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resolution that created the IOC Medical Commission. 55 In
1968, the IOC began testing for a limited range of
stimulants and, in 1976, began testing for anabolic
steroids. 56 After initial success, detection rates dropped but
there was still a perception that doping existed and,
between 1976 and 1999, the IOC created various
organizations to oversee its performance-enhancing drug
policy.57 In 1999, the IOC, still believing its program needed
to be improved, created WADA as an independent agency. 58
"WADA was set up as a foundation under the initiative of
the IOC with the support and participation of
intergovernmental organizations, governments, public
authorities, and other public and private bodies" to promote
and coordinate the fight against doping in sports
internationally. 5 This reform in international doping
control was primarily in response to the doping problems
that arose in cycling during the summer of 1998 and the
discussions that ensued at the 1999 World Conference on
Doping in Sport, which produced the Lausanne Declaration
on Doping in Sport.60
The purposes of the Code and the World Anti-Doping
Program are to protect the athletes' "fundamental right to
participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health,
fairness and equality for Athletes worldwide, and; [t]o
ensure harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping
programs at the international and national level with
regard to detection, deterrence and prevention of doping."
' 61
To achieve this noble goal, the "World Anti-Doping Program
55. Paul H. Haagen, The Players Have Lost That Argument: Doping, Drug
Testing, and Collective Bargaining, 40 NEw ENG. L. REV. 831, 836 (2006).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 836-37; see also Andrew Goldstone, Obstruction of Justice: The
Arbitration Process for Anti-Doping Violations During the Olympic Games, 7
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 361, 367 (2006).
58. Haagen, supra note 55, at 837. Commentators have asserted that WADA
is not truly independent. See, e.g., Selig with Manfred, supra note 7, at 45 n.58
(noting that the IOC paid $25 million towards establishing WADA and provided
for 50% of its annual operating budget).
59. World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA History, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=253 (last visited Aug. 28, 2008).
60. Id.




encompasses . . . optimal harmonization and best practice
in international and national anti-doping programs" by
producing the Code, International Standards, and Models of
Best Practice and Guidelines. 62  The International
Standards cover technical and operational procedures
associated with implementing the Code's provisions and
compliance with these standards is mandatory for
compliance with the Code. 63 For example, the International
Standards dictate detailed procedures for testing, notifying
athletes of the test, preparing for the sample collection
session, security and post test administration, and the
transporting of samples and documentation. 64 The
International Standards are incorporated into the Code by
reference, but are not expressly set forth in the Code to
enable experts and the WADA Executive Committee to
make timely changes without having to amend the Code.
65
The Models of Best Practice and Guidelines are optional
recommendations that provide rules and regulations that
WADA tailors to the needs of each major group of
signatories.66
WADA promulgated the Code, which was adopted at
the World Conference on Doping in Sport in Copenhagen in
March 2003.67 WADA has made extensive revisions to the
Code, which will become effective in 2009.68 The Code
contains four parts: "Doping Control;" "Education and
Research;" "Roles and Responsibilities;" and "Acceptance,
Compliance, Modification and Interpretation."69 Signatories
62. Id. at 12.
63. Id.
64. See generally INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR TESTING (World Anti-Doping
Agency 2003) (version 3.0), http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontentdocument/
testing-v3_a.pdf.
65. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE cmt. at 12.
66. Id. cmt. at 13.
67. Haagen, supra note 55, at 837.
68. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 25.1, at 123.
69. See generally id.
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of the Code include over 350 organizations that are part of
the Olympic movement and 200 non-Olympic signatories. 70
Prior to the recent amendments, the Code obligated
each government to, among other things, support national
anti-doping programs, take affirmative measures to control
the problem of nutritional supplements that contain
undisclosed prohibited substances, and withhold "some or
all financial support from sport organizations and
participants that are not in compliance with the Code."' 71
Furthermore, the Code stated that "all other governmental
involvement with anti-doping will be brought into harmony
with the Code. ' 72 The 2009 version of the Code now
provides that "[e]ach government's commitment to the Code
will be evidenced by its signing the Copenhagen
Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport of March 3, 2003 and
by ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to the
UNESCO Convention. ' 73 The Code then sets forth what
WADA believes is each Signatory's "expectations" of
governmental involvement; these expectations include
duties similar to what the 2003 version of the Code
mandated from governments.
74
70. This list includes the National Olympic Committees of all Olympic
Nations and International Federations for particular sports-from the
International Bobsleigh and Tobogganing Federation and the Badminton World
Federation to the International Federation of Associated Wrestling Styles and
the International Chess Federation, including the International Baseball
Federation and the World Confederation of Billiards. World Anti-Doping
Agency, Code Acceptance, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id=270 (last visited Oct. 6, 2008). The
Code also has over 200 signatories from outside of the Olympic movement-this
number includes 161 National Paralympic Committees. See id. This group of
signatories includes the World Minigolfsport Federation, the International
Federation of Sleddog Sports, and the International Table Soccer Federation.
Id.
71. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 22.1, at 59 (World Anti-Doping Agency
2003) (to be amended 2009) (italics omitted), available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/code-v3.pdf.
72. Id. art. 22.2, at 60 (italics omitted).
73. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 22 introductory cmt. at 113 (World Anti-
Doping Agency 2009) (italics omitted).
74. See id. art. 22.1-.4, at 113-14. The Code further penalizes a government
for its failure to ratify or to comply with the UNESCO Convention. Id. art. 22.6,
at 114. In a comment to Article 22, the Code recognizes that "[m]ost
governments cannot be parties to, or be bound by, private non-governmental
instruments such as the Code." Id. at 114.
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The Code seeks universal harmonization of core anti-
doping elements and provides that all provisions of the
Code are "mandatory in substance and must be followed;"
but while some provisions must be adopted verbatim, other
areas of the Code permit flexibility on how the anti-doping
principles are implemented. 75  While noting that
"[h]armonization of sanctions has been one of the most
discussed and debated areas of anti-doping," WADA
believes harmonization of disciplinary penalties is
necessary and has expressly rejected arguments that the
penalty should be based on the circumstances of a
particular sport-such as the average career length or
salary.76 Thus, WADA endorses a view that it is necessary
to sanction a true amateur under the same guidelines as an
athlete who makes twenty-five million dollars a year.
WADA responds to these concerns by noting that
[a] primary argument in favor of harmonization is that it is simply
not right that two Athletes from the same country who test
positive for the same Prohibited Substance under similar
circumstances should receive different sanctions only because they
participate in different sports. In addition, flexibility in
sanctioning has often been viewed as an unacceptable opportunity
for some sporting organizations to be more lenient with dopers.
The lack of harmonization of sanctions has also frequently been
the source of jurisdictional conflicts between International
Federations and National Anti-Doping Organizations. 77
The Code imposes a strict liability regime when a
prohibited substance is found in the athlete's body; intent,
fault, negligence, or knowledge of use on the athlete's part
75. Id. introduction at 16. The Code mandates that many articles must be
accepted by a signatory "without substantive change," and these articles
include: Article 1 (Definition of Doping); Article 2 (Anti-Doping Rule Violations);
Article 3 (Proof of Doping); Article 4.2.2 (Specified Substances); Article 4.3.3
(WADA's Determination of the Prohibited List); Article 7.6 (Retirement from
Sport); Article 9 (Automatic Disqualification of Individual Results); Article 10
(Sanctions on Individuals); Article 11 (Consequences to Teams); parts of Article
13 (Appeals); Article 15.4 (Mutual Recognition); Article 17 (Statute of
Limitations); Article 24 (Interpretation of the Code); and the definitions section.
Id. art. 23.2.2, at 117-18. However, WADA does not represent that adopting the
Code is sufficient for an organization; rather, WADA advises that signatories
will still need to have their own comprehensive rules. Id. introduction at 16.
76. Id. cmt. to art. 10.2, at 52.
77. Id.
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need not be demonstrated to show a violation. 78 In the 2003
version of the Code, the drafters noted that the strict
liability test is
likely in some sense to be unfair in an individual case .... But it
is also in some sense "unfair" for an Athlete to get food poisoning
on the eve of an important competition. Yet in neither case will the
rules of the competition be altered to undo the unfairness .... The
vicissitudes of competition, like those of life generally, may create
many types of unfairness, whether by accident or the negligence of
unaccountable Persons, which the law cannot repair.
Furthermore, it appears to be a laudable policy objective not to
repair an accidental unfairness to an individual by creating an
intentional unfairness to the whole body of other competitors. This
is what would happen if banned performance-enhancing
substances were tolerated when absorbed inadvertently. 79
Penalties under the Code are more stringent, in terms
of the period of ineligibility, than those imposed by MLB.
The general penalty for a first violation is a two year period
of ineligibility.8 0 The 2009 version will add a provision
where aggravating circumstances may increase the period
of ineligibility up to a maximum of four years.81 It appears
that WADA intends for this provision to be liberally applied
to many hackneyed situations.8 2 When a person is convicted
of a second violation, the 2003 version-the version that
some members of Congress and others have advocated for-
78. Id. art. 2.1.1, at 19. WADA notes that there is a difference between strict
liability to show a violation and the imposition of a fixed period of ineligibility
when strict liability is involved. Id. cmt. to art. 2.1.1, at 19.
79. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE cmt. 2.1.1, at 8-9 (World Anti-Doping Agency
2003) (to be amended 2009) (quoting USA Shooting & Quigley v. UIT, CAS
94/129 (Ct. Arb. Sport 1995)).
80. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 10.3.1, at 53 (World Anti-Doping Agency
2009).
81. Id. art. 10.6, at 65. Athletes can avoid the aggravating circumstances
provision by "admitting the anti-doping rule violation as asserted promptly
after being confronted with the anti-doping rule violation... " Id.
82. See id. cmt. to art. 10.6, at 65 (providing a non-exclusive list of
aggravating circumstances, such as: whether the violation occurred as part of a
doping plan or scheme, either individually or in conspiracy with others; whether
the athlete used or possessed multiple prohibited substances or used a
prohibited substance on multiple occasions; and whether the athlete engaged in
deceptive or obstructive conduct to avoid detection or adjudication).
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imposed a lifetime ban.8 3 The 2009 version eliminates this
automatic "two strikes and you're out rule" and provides a
table to determine the sanction for an athlete convicted of
multiple violations.8 4  The period of ineligibility is
determined by a grid based on whether the first and second
violations were reduced under the Specified Substance
provision,8 5 whether they were because of a filing failure or
missed test, whether they were reduced for "No Significant
Fault or Negligence," whether the standard sanction is
applicable or whether aggravating circumstances were
present, and whether one or both of the violations were for
trafficking or administration of prohibited substances.8 6
Under the 2009 version, a third violation will generally
result in a lifetime ban.87
The Code also provides for the "Elimination or
Reduction of the Period of Ineligibility for Specified
Substances under Specific Circumstances."8 8 Under this
section, if athletes can establish how a "Specified
Substance"8 9 entered their body or came into their
possession and that the Specified Substance was not
intended to enhance their performance or mask the use of a
performance-enhancing substance, then the period of
ineligibility may be reduced. 90 In addition, the hearing
83. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE arts. 10.2, 10.4.1, at 27-28 (World Anti-
Doping Agency 2003) (to be amended 2009).
84. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 10.7.1, at 66 (World Anti-Doping Agency
2009).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
86. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 10.7.1, at 66. When an athlete falls into
the No Fault or Negligence provision, the conduct is not considered a violation
for the purpose of determining a sanction. Id. art. 10.5.1, at 56.
87. Id. art. 10.7.3, at 68. The exceptions to this rule are where the third
violation qualified under Article 10.4-the safe harbor for specified
substances-or is based on a violation for failing to file whereabouts
information and/or a missed test; however, even in these circumstances, the ban
will range from eight years to a lifetime. Id.
88. Id. art. 10.4, at 54 (italics omitted).
89. "Specified Substances" are defined as all Prohibited Substances except
for anabolic agents, hormones, stimulants, and hormone antagonists. Id. art.
4.2.2, at 31.
90. Id. art. 10.4, at 54-55 (italics omitted). For example, the first violation
can be reduced to "[a]t a minimum, a reprimand and no period of Ineligibility
from future Events, and at a maximum, two (2) years of Ineligibility." Id.
20081 1241
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
panel must be "comfortably satisfied" by the objective
evidence-rather than the athlete's mere assertions-that
the athlete did not intend to enhance his or her
performance. 91 WADA notes that the substances that
qualify under the list of "Specified Substances" are "not
necessarily less serious agents for purposes of sports doping
than other Prohibited Substances;" however, "there is a
greater likelihood that Specified Substances, as opposed to
other Prohibited Substances, could be susceptible to a
credible, non-doping explanation." 92
The Code also affords some leniency for exceptional
circumstances where the athlete proves "No Fault or
Negligence" or "No Significant Fault or Negligence."93 If an
athlete can prove "No Fault or Negligence" for the doping
violation and, if the violation was based on a positive test,
how the prohibited substance entered his or her system, the
period of eligibility will be eliminated. 94 If the athlete can
establish "No Significant Fault or Negligence," the period of
ineligibility may be reduced up to one-half of the otherwise
applicable sanction-or, if the ban is lifetime, no less than
eight years. 95 However, the Code warns that these
exceptions are to be narrowly construed. 96 An example of
"No Fault or Negligence" occurs where the athlete can
"prove that, despite all due care, he or she was sabotaged by
a competitor."97 "No Fault or Negligence" does not exist
where: (a) a positive test results from a mislabeled or
contaminated vitamin or nutritional supplement, since
athletes are responsible for what they ingest under Article
2.1.1 of the Code; (b) administration of a prohibited
substance by the athlete's physician or trainer without
91. Id. art. 10.4 & cmt. to art. 10.4, at 54-55 (italics omitted).
92. Id. at 54.
93. Id. art. 10.5, at 56-57. The Code also encourages athletes to provide
substantial assistance to anti-doping organizations, criminal authorities, or
professional disciplinary bodies in establishing or discovering an anti-doping
violation of another person, or in helping convict or sanction the other person by
reducing the period of ineligibility for a convicted athlete. Id. art. 10.5.3, at 58-
59.
94. Id. art. 10.5.1, at 56.
95. Id. art. 10.5.2, at 57.
96. Id. cmt. to arts. 10.5.1-.2, at 56-57.
97. Id. at 56.
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disclosure to the athlete, since athletes are responsible for
their choice of medical personnel; and (c) sabotage of the
athlete's food or drink by a spouse, coach, or other person
within the athlete's "circle of associates," since athletes are
responsible for what they ingest and for the actions of
persons allowed access to their food and drink.98 "However,
depending on the unique facts of a particular case, any of
the referenced illustrations could result in a reduced
sanction based on No Significant Fault or Negligence." 99
To maximize the effect of sanctions, the Code calls for
reciprocity. During the period of ineligibility, the Code
provides that the athlete may not even participate in non-
Signatory leagues or events or, if the athlete does, "the
results of such participation shall be Disqualified and the
period of Ineligibility which was originally imposed shall
start over again as of the date of the violation." 10 0 In
addition, the Code requires Signatories to recognize the
actions of non-Signatories if the rules of the non-Signatory
are consistent with the Code. 10 1 For example, if a non-
Signatory's process of establishing a violation is consistent
with the Code and the non-Signatory establishes a violation
but provides for a shorter period of ineligibility, "then all
Signatories should recognize the finding of an anti-doping
rule violation and the Athlete's National Anti-Doping
Organization should conduct a hearing . . . to determine
whether the longer period of Ineligibility provided in the
Code should be imposed." 102
98. Id. at 56-57.
99. Id. at 57.
100. Id. art. 10.10.2, at 75 (emphasis in original). It is unclear how WADA
would disqualify such results of an organization it has no control over.
101. Id. art. 15.4.2, at 94.
102. Id. cmt. to art. 15.4.2, at 94.
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The Code provides for "non-analytical positive[s]" where
violations are demonstrated without a positive test. 0 3 Even
athletes who confess to an anti-doping rule violation before
they are notified of an up-coming test are subject to
discipline under the Code.' 0 4 However, if the confession is
the only reliable evidence of the violation at the time, the
period of ineligibility may be reduced up to one-half of the
otherwise applicable sanction. 1
05
The Code requires each anti-doping organization to
conduct an "effective number" of in-competition and out-of-
competition tests. 106 The Code also provides that there shall
be no advance notice for out-of-competition testing and
requires signatories to make "target testing" a priority. 10
7
WADA believes target testing is preferred over random
testing because it is more effective in ensuring that
appropriate athletes will be tested.108 For example, "world-
class Athletes, Athletes whose performances have
dramatically improved over a short period of time, [and]
Athletes whose coaches have had other Athletes test
positive" should be singled out and tested; this standard
does not require any reasonable suspicion or probable cause
requirement for non-random, target testing 0 9 Apparently,
under this profiling rule, being a great athlete is-in
itself-probable cause of being a cheater. The Code provides
that samples shall be analyzed to establish violations or to
103. See Cameron A. Myler, Resolution of Doping Disputes in Olympic
Sport: Challenges Presented by "Non-Analytical" Cases, 40 NEw ENG. L. REV.
747, 749 (2006). Under the Code, these non-analytical positives include
attempted use, admissions, third party testimony, missing a sample collection,
violating the out-of-competition availability requirements, tampering with any
part of doping control, possession of prohibited substances and methods-
including possession by athlete's support personnel-trafficking, administration
or attempted administration of a prohibited substance or method to any athlete,
and assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up, or any other type of
collusion involving an anti-doping rule violation or any attempted violation.
WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE arts. 2.2-.8, at 21-25 (World Anti-Doping Agency
2009).
104. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 10.5.4, at 61.
105. Id.
106. Id. art. 5.1.1, at 37.
107. Id. arts. 5.1.2, 5.1.3, at 38.
108. Id. cmt. to art. 5.1.3, at 38.
109. Id.
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assist the anti-doping organization in creating a profile for
the athlete. 110
Under the Code, WADA has the sole authority to
create, publish, and revise the list of prohibited substances,
and signatories are not permitted to exempt substances.111
WADA also monitors compliance with the Code and
signatories are required to report to WADA on its
compliance and explain reasons for non-compliance every
two years. 112
As the foregoing illustrates, the Code is comprehensive,
particularly in light of the fact that this Comment
significantly condensed or omitted several parts of the Code
and barely addressed the mandatory International
Standards. This precision is a major impediment to MLB
adopting the Code. However, there is a solution: soft law.
II. WHAT IS SOFT LAW?
A. What is Soft Law?
"Soft law" is a recent field of study developed by legal
scholars. "Hard law" typically denotes "legally binding
obligations that are precise ... and that delegate authority
for interpreting and implementing the law." 113 At the other
end of the legalization continuum is no law or purely
political arrangements. 114 Soft law has been used to refer to
the gap between hard law and political arrangements. 115 It
has been noted that soft law is a vague term and the "only
common thread" among arrangements that have been
labeled as soft law is that they are not formally binding.
116
110. See id. art. 6.2, at 39.
111. Id. art. 4.1, at 29.
112. Id. art. 23.4.1-.2, at 118-19.
113. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in
International Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 421 (2000).
114. See id. at 422.
115. Id.
116. David M. Trubek et al., "Soft Law," "Hard Law," and European
Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity 1 (Univ. of Wis. Law Sch. Legal




Some commentators have defined soft law as legal
agreements that are weakened in terms of their obligation,
precision, and/or delegation. 117 Others have defined soft law
as arrangements lacking other characteristics that are
common in state laws, such as "obligation, uniformity,
justiciability, sanctions, and/or an enforcement staff."118 Yet
another definition of soft law refers to 'rules of conduct
which in principle have no legally binding force but which
nevertheless may have practical effects."'
119
Soft law should not be confused with a hard legal
agreement that is under-inclusive or "weak" in a
substantive sense. For example, legalization in this field
has intentionally been defined in terms of characteristics of
rules-not in terms of effects, nor its substantive content. 120
In evaluating which legalization strategy is proper for
MLB, this Comment seeks only to discuss the form of
legalization-not what the substance of MLB's policy
should contain. When one does not conflate a soft
legalization strategy with a law that is "soft" in the
conventional sense, the benefits of a soft law may be more
fully appreciated. With this in mind, by altering the level of
obligation, delegation, and precision, soft legalization
arrangements are flexible and can be tailored to fit the
circumstances of a particular situation.
Obligation means that actors "are bound by a rule or
commitment."'12 1 Obligation is often associated with "legal
responsibility"-agreements that cannot be disregarded as
preferences change. 122 In this sense, legal obligation does
not refer to "obligations" merely "resulting from coercion,
comity, or morality." 123 One effect of an agreement high in
obligation is that, because the actors are legally bound,
117. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 113, at 422. In this model, legal
obligation is accorded the most weight, followed by delegation, and then
precision. See also Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54
INT'L ORG. 401, 405 (2000).
118. See, e.g., Trubek et al., supra note 116, at 1.
119. Id. at 1-2 (quoting Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of EC Law, in
IMPLEMENTING EC LAW IN THE UK (T. Daintith ed., 1995)).
120. Abbott et al., supra note 117, at 402.
121. Id. at 401.
122. See id. at 408-09.
123. Id. at 408.
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their behavior "is subject to scrutiny under the general
rules, procedures, and discourse of international law."'124
Therefore, if a dispute subsequently arises, the parties will
not be able to assert a defense based on their sovereignty,
interests, or power; they are confined to defenses based on
the "text, purpose, and history of the rules, their
interpretation, admissible exceptions, applicability to
classes of situations, and particular facts."'125
Delegation refers to a third party's dispute resolution
authority and the third party's rule-making and
implementation authority.126 Factors that impact the
degree of delegation include the power of an enforcing body
to monitor compliance, the enforcing body's independence
from the actors, and the enforcing body's ability to reach
and enforce a binding solution. 127 Complete delegation has
been defined as granting third parties the authority to
"implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve
disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules."128 Third
party interpretation and application of rules has been
considered essential to legal institutions. 129
Precision refers to the level of detail in the
agreement. 130 A precise agreement narrows an actor's
flexibility to interpret the agreement in a manner favorable
to his or her interests by "unambiguously defin[ing] the
conduct [it] require[s], authorize[s], or proscribe[s]. '' 131 As
previously discussed, an agreement that is "soft," because it
is low in precision, should not be conflated with a weak or
less effective agreement. The effectiveness of a legal
agreement largely hinges on how those who are bound by
the rule will interpret it.132 "[A] rule saying 'drive slowly'
might yield slower driving than a rule prescribing a speed
limit of 55 miles per hour if the drivers in question would
124. See id. at 401.
125. See id. at 409.
126. Id. at 416 tbl.4.
127. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 113, at 424 n.9.
128. Abbott et al., supra note 117, at 401.
129. Id. at 406.
130. See id. at 401.
131. Id. at 401, 412.
132. See id. at 412 n.26.
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normally drive 50 miles per hour and understand 'slowly' to
mean 10 miles per hour slower than normal."133
B. Benefits of Soft Law
Some debate in this field has centered on whether soft
law is merely an interim step toward harder law and
therefore, a "second best" solution that results when
negotiations fail. 134 After discussing the arguments on both
sides, Abbott and Snidal conclude that soft law is a
deliberately chosen form of legalization because of the
unique advantages it offers. 135 Under either view, soft law
can be used in the short term as a bridge to implementing a
harder, more binding legal arrangement. 136 Thus, soft law
is a great tool to "break a deadlock in negotiations where
disparities in wealth, power, and interests make binding
agreements impossible."'137 Factors such as "transaction
costs, uncertainty, implications for national sovereignty,
divergence of preferences, and power differentials"
influence the level of legalization. 138
Some authors have recommended that hard
legalization should be strategically used to increase the
credibility of legal commitments when: (1) "the benefits of
cooperation are great but the potential for opportunism and
its costs are high;" (2) "noncompliance is difficult to detect;"
and (3) a party wishes to form an alliance but only with
others who are "sincerely committed" to compliance. 139
Hard law reduces the transaction costs, which may arise in
maintaining and enforcing the agreement, by limiting
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 113, at 422-23; Trubek et al.,
supra note 116, at 29, 31-32 (noting that some view soft law as a second best
solution, but asserting that further information and analysis could show that
"soft law might be a desirable alternative rather than simply a second best
solution or a way station towards hard law").
135. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 113, at 423.
136. See id.
137. Trubek et al., supra note 116, at 11-12.
138. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 113, at 423.
139. Id. at 429.
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future conflicts to legal, rather than political and policy,
arguments. 140
Commentators have discussed the European
Employment Strategy and the soft law regime it employs in
the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). 141 The European
Employment Strategy was developed in the late 1990s to
combat the economic problems European Union (EU)
Member States were facing. 142 Member States were
reluctant to transfer policy-making power to the EU, but
agreed to a process that allowed the EU to monitor their
economic policies; this peer review and the corresponding
recommendations encouraged the Member States to"pursue the difficult and politically controversial policies
that would be necessary." 14
3
"The OMC is based upon at least six general principles:
participation and power sharing, multi-level integration,
diversity and decentralization, deliberation, flexibility and
revisability, and experimentation and knowledge
creation."'144 This model "accommodates diversity, facilitates
mutual learning, spreads good practices, and fosters
convergence toward EU goals."'145 Proponents of this model
point out that "soft law processes are appropriate when the
gap between the aspired norm and existing reality is so
large that hard regulatory provisions will be meaningless.
Soft mechanisms allow minimum levels of adherence to be
established and formalize progressive advancement toward
higher standards."'146 It is also argued that "softer forms of
governance such as the OMC increase the social basis of
legitimacy of the EU by allowing stakeholders to participate
in the policy process and thereby facilitating knowledge
diffusion and engendering a feeling of enfranchisement and
investment in the system."'147 The OMC is able to "change
140. Id. at 430, 433.
141. See generally Trubek et al., supra note 116, at 14-21.
142. James S. Mosher & David M. Trubek, EU Social Policy and the
European Employment Strategy, 41 J. COMMON MKT. STuD. 63, 67 (2003).
143. Id.
144. Trubek et al., supra note 116, at 15.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 16.
147. Id. at 16-17.
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and channel behavior" through: (1) shaming; (2) diffusion
through mimesis; (3) diffusion through discourse; (4)
networking; (5) deliberation; and (6) learning. 148
Commentators have praised the OMC because of its
acceptance of diversity and the overall democratic process
that it embraces, concluding that
[t]he OMC is an appropriate tool to use in situations when
common problems exist across Europe but conditions make
uniform policies impossible and there is great uncertainty as to
the best way to deal with problems. In such situations, a learning-
producing system that engages multiple levels, promotes dialogue,
cuts across traditional boundaries, and fosters local
experimentation could produce better results than directives or
other binding and more or less uniform solutions. 149
Soft law has other benefits that have made it a
deliberately chosen legalization strategy. 150 Soft law can
reduce the negotiation, contracting, and other transaction
costs that arise from vigorous debate over policy issues.151
Hard legalization increases the cost of violation, which
means that actors are more prone to exercise due diligence
when negotiating and will want to leave room for self-
protection when drafting a hard legal agreement. 152 The
International Labor Organization has changed its
legalization strategy from aiming for hard law, via draft
conventions that were ratified at low rates, to creating non-
binding recommendations and codes of conduct that reduce
the costs of national ratification. 153
Soft law also limits the autonomy a party loses by
entering into a legal relationship with another actor. 5 4
Through soft law, a party is able to learn about the
consequences of the agreement through a trial and error
process, which can facilitate the move to harder
148. Id. at 17-18.
149. Mosher & Trubek, supra note 142, at 63, 84.
150. Abbot & Snidal, supra note 113, at 433.
151. Id. at 434.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 435.
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legalization. 155 For example, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was originally a form of
soft law, led to the World Trade Agreement as states saw
the possible benefits of hard legalization. 156 Hard law,
particularly when delegation is high, involves significant
sovereignty and autonomy costs. 157 Abbott and Snidal
suggest that "[s]overeignty costs are at their highest when
international agreements impinge on the relations between
a state and its citizens." 158 By using soft legalization
strategies, an agreement can be drafted in a manner that
respects each actor's autonomy:
Soft legalization allows states to adapt their commitments to their
particular situations rather than trying to accommodate divergent
national circumstances within a single text. This provides for
flexibility in implementation, helping states deal with the
domestic political and economic consequences of an agreement and
thus increasing the efficiency with which it is carried out.
Accordingly, soft law should be attractive in proportion to the
degree of divergence among the preferences and capacities of
states .... 159
In sum, soft law can facilitate compromise, reduce
transaction costs, and can operate as a bridge to further
legalization by allowing actors to learn the consequences of
their legal commitments. Most importantly, soft law is an
effective tool in social and economic context because it
respects diversity and limits the intrusion upon an
organization's autonomy.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 436 (discussing how the GATT was originally adopted
provisionally, included a withdrawal clause, and created only "skeletal
institutions").
157. Id. at 436.
158. Id. at 437.
159. Id. at 445.
2008] 1251
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
III. LEGAL PLURALISM: WHO DIED AND MADE WADA "THE
Boss"?
A. Overview
The issue of performance-enhancing drugs in
professional sports leagues creates an unusual clash of
interests between the NLRA, the role of federal and state
legislation prohibiting (or choosing not to prohibit) the
possession or distribution of certain substances, the WADA
Code, and the interests of fans and society. Legal pluralism
has been premised on two theories. First, multiple legal
entities can co-exist in the same territory. 160 Second, non-
state actors can create law. 161
One area of study has been on the legal obligations that
arise out of social relationships. 162 Recent commentary, in
the wake of globalization, has considered the movement,
diffusion, and expansion of legal relations from a local level
with local implications to worldwide levels and
implications. 163 In this area, "'autonomous non-state legal
order[s] with special rules and special adjudicating [and in
particular arbitral] bodies"' have arisen. 164 In the sports law
field, this has been discussed as "lex sportiva
160. Marc Hertogh, What is Non-State Law? Mapping the Other Hemisphere
of the Legal World, in THE STATE LEGISLATURE AND NON-STATE LAW (J. van
Schooten & J.M. Verschuuren eds., forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 4,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1008451).
161. Id.
162. Id. (manuscript at 5). An example of this form of governing relevant to
MLB is the issue of unwritten rules of baseball that were "cited" to criticize Alex
Rodriguez for yelling "Hah!" or 'Mine!" to make a fielder drop a routine pop-up.
Dave Sheinin, It's Okay to Steal Signs and Bases-Except When It's Not, WASH.
POST, June 10, 2007, at E14 (noting and discussing how "the Unwritten Rules
are constantly shifting, according to the customs of the time and the nature of
the game"). Rodriquez was criticized for making a "hush league" play and
accused of violating conduct players know not to engage in, but that is
technically allowed by the rules of the game. See id.
163. Hertogh, supra note 160 (manuscript at 14).
164. Id. (manuscript at 15) (second alteration in original) (quoting Ralf
Michaels, The Re-State-Ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and




internationalis."'16 5 For example, during the 2004 Turin
Winter Olympic Games, which were the first games under
the WADA Code, the IOC persuaded Italy to not enforce its
criminal anti-doping laws, as the IOC was concerned that
athletes who tested positive would face criminal charges. 1
66
Sport associations create their own "laws" by
developing rules that govern on and off the field conduct
and eligibility. These rules can have an impact on society as
a whole. For example, the rules may be incorporated into
amateur and social sporting events, fans may find the rules
incompatible with their interests as a fan, and the rules
may be implemented into our tort system. 167 By nature,
some of these rules are necessarily arbitrary and give
certain individuals an advantage over others-indeed, an
advantage that can affect a person's chances of becoming a
professional athlete. 16 8
B. Governmental Action
In the realm of drug testing, many of the performance-
enhancing substances that fans are concerned about are
illegal under federal law. 169 Congress criminalized many
drug offenses by enacting the Controlled Substances Act in
1970.170
In 1973, Congress conducted a study on the use of
illegal and dangerous drugs in sports. 171 The subcommittee
165. Id. (manuscript at 15).
166. Gordon A. Martin, Jr., How it All Began: The Move to Drug Testing, 40
NEW ENG. L. REV. 705, 709-10 (2006).
167. Cf. Morgan v. State, 685 N.E.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. 1997) ("The balance
struck at the threshold duty stage of responsibility and adjudication [in sports-
related assumption of risk cases] is that the tort rules support a social policy to
'facilitate free and vigorous participation in athletic activities."' (quoting
Benitez v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 541 N.E.2d 29, 33 (N.Y. 1989))).
168. See, e.g., Greg Spira, The Boys of Late Summer, SLATE, Apr. 16, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2188866 (theorizing that the cut-off date little leagues
have selected for eligibility has impacted which athletes play professional
baseball).
169. See generally Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
170. Id.
171. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 28.
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report concluded that 'the degree of improper drug use-
primarily amphetamines and anabolic steroids-can only be
described as alarming."' 172 The subcommittee's chairperson
advised leagues to adopt 'stringent penalties for illegal use,
i.e., fines, suspension or even barring for life, if
warranted."' 173
Steroid use in American professional sports has
received considerable attention from Congress since
1999.174 During March 2004 hearings, Congress "treated
every deviation from the WADA model as a sign of a weak
commitment to dealing with performance-enhancingdrugs
[sic]. ' 175 Senator John McCain told the MLBPA's Executive
Director:
Your failure to commit to addressing this issue straight on and
immediately will motivate this committee to search for legislative
remedies .... I can tell you and your players that you represent
the status quo is not acceptable. And we will have to act in some
way unless the players at Major League Players Association act in
affirmative and rapid fashion.... [T]he integrity of the sport, and
the American people, demand a certain level of adherence [to]
standards that, frankly, is not being met at this time. 176
Congress was back in action in 2005, when the House of
Representatives' Government Reform Committee
subpoenaed and questioned several MLB players.177
Thomas M. Davis III, the chairman of the committee, stated
that "the problem of steroids has been systematic
172. Id. (quoting source omitted).
173. Id. (quoting Press Release, Office of Congressman Harley 0. Staggers
(May 11, 1973)).
174. See Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League
Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 307 (2005); Steroid Use in Professional Baseball and
Anti-Doping Issues in Amateur Sports: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 107th Cong. 7 (2002); Effects of Performance
Enhancing Drugs on the Health of Athletes and Athletic Competition: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 106th Cong. 54 (1999).
175. Haagen, supra note 55, at 843.
176. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 56 (citing Effectiveness of Drug Testing in
Preventing Steroid Use: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 108th Cong. 73 (2004)).
177. See generally Restoring Faith in America's Pastime, supra note 174.
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throughout baseball."178  Eventually, six bills were
introduced in Congress to regulate performance-enhancing
drugs. 179 Commentators noted that the proposed bills were
considerably more stringent than the policies that currently
existed in professional sports. 180 All of the bills incorporated
WADA's prohibited substance list.181 The Senate
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee also
held hearings regarding two bills in 2005.182 Each bill
would have forced the leagues to adopt standards and
penalties at least as stringent as the WADA Code; however,
according to a commentator, the bills were not drafted in
response to international pressure. 183
Once again, perceiving that the collective bargaining
process is still ineffective in American professional sports
leagues, Congress brought American professional sports
back to Capitol Hill in 2008.184 Representative Bobby Rush,
the subcommittee's chairperson, noted that the issue of
performance-enhancing drugs presents public policy
concerns as steroids are "a serious public health problem"
requiring much "congressional scrutiny." 18 5 During these
hearings, Congress continued to praise the Olympic model
and even labeled it the "gold standard." 8 6  One
Representative stated that it had become "more and more
178. Paul A. Fortenberry & Brian E. Hoffman, Illegal Muscle: A
Comparative Analysis of Proposed Steroid Legislation and the Policies in
Professional Sports' CBAs that Led to the Steroid Controversy, 5 VA. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 121, 128 (2006) (citing Dan Jung, Congressional Hearing on Steroids in
Baseball, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlarticles/A41366-2005Mar16.html).
179. Showalter, supra note 2, at 660.
180. Id. at 664.
181. Id.
182. Haagen, supra note 55, at 831.
183. Id. at 831-32.
184. See Drugs in Sports: Compromising the Health of Athletes and
Undermining the Integrity of Competition: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. of
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 110th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2008) (LEXIS) [hereinafter Drugs in Sports
Hearing].
185. Id. at *2 (statement of Rep. Bobby L. Rush, Chairperson, H. Subcomm.
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection).
186. Id. at *31 (statement of Rep. Lee Terry, Member, H. Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection).
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clear" that federal legislation is needed.' 8 7 On the other
side, another Representative stated that this issue is a
private business issue between MLB and its fans that
should be resolved by the marketplace and it is up to MLB
whether or not they want to become an entertainment
spectacle like professional wrestling. 88 In addition, at a
hearing pertaining to the International Convention Against
Doping in Sport, Senator Joseph Biden stated: "I believe
that we should have the same code for all sport in America.
It should be as tough as the Olympic standards, and it is
not, whether it's professional sports or amateur sport."'18 9
In regard to enforcement of laws that Congress has
enacted, the most renowned governmental effort has been
the BALCO investigation. BALCO created a designer
steroid that was originally undetectable by drug testing.190
The BALCO investigation, which began in 2002, has led to
the criminal investigation of, charges against, and
convictions of several well-known athletes. 191 As part of this
investigation, federal investigators executed search
warrants for two private firms involved in MLB's 2003
survey testing to obtain drug testing records and samples
for ten MLB players connected with the BALCO
investigation. 192 The investigators seized data that enabled
them to identify the MLB players who tested positive
187. Id. at *3 (statement of Rep. Janice Schakowsky, Member, H. Subcomm.
on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection).
188. Id. at *6 (statement of Rep. Anthony Weiner, Member, H. Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection).
189. The International Convention Against Doping in Sport: Hearing Before
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong., at *3 (May 22, 2008) (LEXIS)
(statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations).
190. Showalter, supra note 2, at 652; see also Posting of Rick Karcher to
Sports Law Blog, Open Letter to Bud Selig, http://sports-
law.blogspot.com/search?q=polygraph (July 14, 2006, 7:30:00 EST) (arguing for
MLB to use polygraph tests to catch the cheaters in MLB instead of the
traditional drug tests).
191. See, e.g., Marion Jones Released from Texas Federal Prison, Sept. 5,
2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/trackandfield/news/story?id=3570875
(discussing Marion Jones's release from prison after serving a six-month
sentence for perjury, which she committed during the BALCO investigation).
192. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 58.
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during the 2003 anonymous survey testing. 193
Circumstances such as this implicate player privacy rights
and support the MLBPA's insistence that proper safeguards
are contained in the policy.
C. Major League Baseball Players
A threshold question is: How have the players
associations had so much power? Contrary to popular belief,
unions have not been granted ultimate veto authority. After
a deadlock or impasse in bargaining, an employer has some
power to unilaterally implement terms and conditions of
employment, if further collective bargaining would be
futile.194 However, this policy does not apply to partial or
"piecemeal" impasses and, therefore, the owners would be
risking a strike or lock-out. 195 In addition, the union would
surely challenge the league's actions as an unfair labor
practice for failing to attempt to bargain in good faith. 196
According to some studies, the majority of MLB players
do not support the use of performance-enhancing
substances and feel cheated by those who use them.197 One
source indicates that seventy-nine percent of active players
in 2002 were in favor of implementing a drug testing
policy. 198 In addition, the Mitchell Report notes that some
players initially refused to participate in the 2003 survey
testing to increase the number of positive tests, so that the
193. Id. at 59. The MLBPA petitioned a federal court to have the seized data
returned and to quash grand jury subpoenas. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the district court's decision granting these motions; however,
the opinion was withdrawn and a rehearing was granted in 2008. United States
v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915, 943 (9th Cir. 2006),
withdrawn and reh'g granted, 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Rocco,
supra note 4 (discussing Fourth Amendment concerns involved in the case
related to players who were not part of the BALCO investigation).
194. See generally 25 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Bargaining Impasse § 4
(1981).
195. See id. § 1.
196. See id. § 2.
197. See MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 14-15 (citing various studies indicating
MLB players felt cheated by those who use performance-enhancing substances
and were in favor of testing).
198. Id. at 15 (citing Mel Antonen, Steroids: Are They Worth It?, USA
TODAY, July 8, 2002, at Al).
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five percent threshold would be exceeded and random
testing would be implemented in 2004.199
This begs the question as to why this putative silent
majority of players are being held captive by the minority
who desire to cheat and/or wish to be free from what they
consider an intrusive invasion into their privacy. Are our
unions running on a tyranny by the minority system? The
fundamental concept of unions is that they operate by the
will of the majority.200 The members of a union act through
a representative-much like our political system-who has
the power to create and restrict the rights of union
members and other non-member employees. 20 1 If the
majority does not like the actions the union takes, the
majority can rely on the traditional democratic process to
remove the union officials. 20 2 By deduction, it may be
argued that the majority of players do not want stringent
drug testing imposed upon players, but they have been able
to pass the culpability on to the union.203 Such a conclusion
is collaborated by the anecdotal evidence that a majority of
players use performance-enhancing substances. 204
If the players who favor drug testing are actually in the
minority, they are likely without a remedy. Under the
NLRA, the Supreme Court has held that an "employee may
disagree with many of the union decisions but is bound by
199. Id.
200. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000); NLRB. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175, 180-81 (1967).
201. See § 159(a); Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 180.
202. See § 159(a).
203. Of course, there are alternative explanations for the players' inaction.
For example, their support of the union's other actions outweigh their anti-
doping preferences and, therefore, they want to keep the same leaders in place.
Alternatively, the players may wish to hang on to an anti-testing position as a
bargaining chip to obtain concessions from the owners in other collective
bargaining issues. Others have noted that while athletes appreciate drug
testing because it fights cheating, they are also apprehensive about testing
because of the strong presumption of guilt that arises after a positive drug test.
Goldstein, supra note 6, at 164. Goldstein also notes that "[a]thletes are forced
to put their entire career on the line through a blind faith belief that the testing
done at the accredited labs will be proper and the specimens turned over will be
properly handled and not contaminated to cause an undeserved adverse
finding." Id. at 170.
204. See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 60-61.
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them. 'The majority-rule concept is today unquestionably at
the center of our federal labor policy.' 20 5 Since the NLRA
provides that a union is the exclusive representative of the
employees-which prevents employees from individually
negotiating agreements with the employer-the Supreme
Court has implied that there is a containment statutory
duty upon unions "to represent all members fairly. ' 206 This
duty is known as the duty of fair representation and has
developed to protect the rights of workers who are in the
minority from being oppressed.207
[T]he duty of fair representation requires a union "to serve the
interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward
any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and
honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."... [A] union breaches the
duty of fair representation when its conduct toward a member of
the bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.
208
"[A] union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the
factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's
actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a 'wide range
of reasonableness,' as to be irrational."20 9 'A union's
discriminatory conduct violates its duty of fair
representation if it is 'invidious.' Bad faith requires a
showing of fraud, or deceitful or dishonest action.' ' 210
205. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 180 (quoting Harry H. Wellington, Union
Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System,
67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1333 (1958)).
206. Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
207. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 493
U.S. 67, 79 (1989) (noting that the duty of fair representation "is an essential
means of enforcing fully the important principle that 'no individual union
member may suffer invidious, hostile treatment at the hands of the majority of
his coworkers"' (quoting Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274,
301 (1971)); Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182 ("[The duty of fair representation has stood
as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of
traditional forms of redress.").
208. Marquez, 525 U.S. at 44 (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177).
209. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (quoting
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)) (citation omitted).
210. Teamsters Local Union No. 435 v. NLRB, 92 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir.
1996) (quoting Aguinaga v. United Food & Comm. Workers Int'l Union, 993
F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993)).
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In hearing a breach of fair representation claim, courts
will review the substantive aspects of a bargaining
representative's conduct.211 However, bargaining
representatives are allowed to exercise discretion and
courts should be "highly deferential" to the representative's
decisions; therefore, the representative's decisions will be
reviewed only to determine whether they fall with a "wide
range of reasonableness," even if those judgments are
ultimately wrong. 212 The Court has also noted that
[a]ny authority to negotiate derives its principal strength from a
delegation to the negotiators of a discretion to make such
concessions and accept such advantages as, in the light of all
relevant considerations, they believe will best serve the interests
of the parties represented. A major responsibility of negotiators is
to weigh the relative advantages and disadvantages of differing
proposals.213
The Supreme Court has held that the wide latitude and
authority that this standard grants to union
representatives even allows the union representative to
engage in a form of self-dealing to the detriment of the
other members. 214
Under this standard, a player who favors drug testing
would face a daunting battle to establish that the union's
conduct breached the duty of fair representation by not
agreeing to a stringent drug testing plan. The MLBPA's
discretion in balancing the various interests during
negotiations would likely be respected by a court.21 5 The
211. See Air Line Pilots, 499 U.S. at 75-76; Vaca, 386 U.S. at 181.
212. Marquez, 525 U.S. at 45-46.
213. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337-38 (1953).
214. See Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. at 339 (citing Aeronautical Indus. Dist.
Lodge v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949)).
215. But see Teamsters Local Union No. 435, 92 F.3d at 1071-72 ("The union
is not authorized to assume what terms would be acceptable to the majority of
its membership; rather, such determinations are 'matter[s] for the bargaining
table.' The union acted arbitrarily by taking upon itself the task of determining
what the majority would accept, rather than promoting the interests of the
various units and letting the democratic process resolve the issues. Through its
actions, the union, rather than its membership, determined that the
consolidation should favor [one group, the majority, of employees over a smaller
group of employees]." (quoting Teamsters Local Union No. 42 v. N.L.R.B., 825
F.2d 608, 613 (1st Cir. 1987))). Even if a player were to successfully challenge
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players have various interests involved in this subject, such
as competing in a clean sport; being able to take products
that the government does not prohibit them from taking;
and their medical privacy interest. Most importantly, the
union has been limiting the intrusion upon a right so
fundamental that we have decided to protect it under our
Bill of Rights when governmental action is involved: the
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 216
At the other end of the spectrum, some may assert we
should not be allowing unions to forfeit this fundamental,
individual right on behalf of players. However, courts have
held that a union can voluntarily consent to drug testing
that would otherwise violate a public sector employee's
Fourth Amendment rights. 217  One court noted "[i]f
individual public employees may litigate such questions
despite the resolution reached through collective
bargaining, the utility of collective bargaining with respect
the drug testing policy, the remedy would most likely be limited. The remedy
for a breach of the duty of fair representation "must vary with the
circumstances of the particular breach." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 195 (1967).
Remedies under the National Labor Relations Act should be "limited to carrying
out the policies of the [National Labor Relations] Act" and "[o]ne of these
fundamental policies is freedom of contract." H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S.
99, 108 (1970) (footnote omitted). "Thus, the [National Labor Relations] Board[,
the ordinary adjudicative body for claims arising under the NLRA,] cannot
dictate the terms of a labor contract, which should be decided upon by the give
and take of collective bargaining." Teamsters Local Union No. 435, 92 F.3d at
1072-73.
216. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); Chandler
v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
217. See, e.g., Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 824, 826-28 (3d
Cir. 1991) (en banc); Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111, 119 (1st
Cir. 1988) ("[An employee's] cognizable expectation of privacy depend[s] to a
great extent upon the concessions the union made regarding working conditions
during collective bargaining."); Util. Workers of Am. Local 246 v. S. Cal. Edison,
Co. 852 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1988) ("To the best of our knowledge .... no
court has held that the right to be free from drug testing is one that cannot be
negotiated away, and we decline to make such a ruling here."); see also Am.
Postal Workers Union v. USPS, 871 F.2d 556, 557 (6th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a
Fourth Amendment challenge to searches of employee lockers partly because
the searches were authorized by the collective bargaining agreement).
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to drug testing in the public sector would be greatly
diminished."218
However, by enacting the NLRA, Congress has given
the power to unions to do something that it could not do
itself--override the Constitution's guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 219 The protection of
constitutional guarantees is why the Supreme Court first
implied the duty of fair representation. 220 Judge Nygaard,
in a concurring and dissenting opinion in the Third Circuit's
decision in Bolden, argued that the Fourth Amendment is
an "individual right [that] is enshrined in our Constitution
just so [an employer and a union] cannot collectively
218. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 828; see also Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. at 337 ("[The
NLRA] exemplifies the faith of Congress in free collective bargaining between
employers and their employees when conducted by freely and fairly chosen
representatives of appropriate units of employees.").
219. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-80 (1803) ("It is a
proposition too plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the constitution
by an ordinary act."); see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309 (holding that
suspicionless drug testing was an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment). Of course, even this argument only applies where the testing
would be an unconstitutional search and seizure. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 833
(Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
220. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198 (1944).
From this decision, the duty of fair representation has also been implied in the
National Labor Relations Act. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177; see also Bolden, 953
F.2d at 834 (Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("If federal or
state regulations and statutes cannot force employees to be tested in the
absence of reasonable circumstances, there is no principled reason to find, as
the majority does, that a union whose authority derives from statutes has
actual authority to waive the constitutional rights of its members by
'contractually' binding them to unreasonable searches and seizures.").
Accordingly, the Court held that "the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the
statutory representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally
the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a
legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it
legislates." Steele, 323 U.S. at 202. The Court also noted that petitioner was
claiming a right under the Constitution. Id. at 204. In a concurring opinion,
Justice Murphy noted: "While such a union is essentially a private organization,
its power to represent and bind all members of a class or craft is derived solely
from Congress.... [I]t cannot be assumed that Congress meant to authorize the
representative to act so as to ignore rights guaranteed by the Constitution." Id.
at 208 (Murphy, J., concurring).
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compromise . . ." it.221 Judge Nygaard urged that a
preference for collective bargaining does not justify ignoring
individual rights. 222  Indeed, the Constitution is the
supreme law of the land and constitutional safeguards
should prevail over a statutory scheme such as the
NLRA. 223 Judge Nygaard further reasoned that
Fourth Amendment rights are guaranteed to individuals. Unions
do not have inherent actual authority to waive such constitutional
rights; else individual rights would be sacrificed for some
perceived collective good as' unions negotiate to get economically
related benefits for their members as a whole. The Bill of Rights is
predicated on the notion that minority or individual rights must be
protected from assault by the majority. 224
This led Judge Nygaard to conclude that constitutional
rights should not be "relegated . . . to the status of a
bargaining chip . . . [where] the individual possessing the
right chooses not to give it up but instead to stand upon
it. '' 225 However, Bolden involved a union's agreement with a
public sector employer and, accordingly, the Constitution's
protection was implicated. Since MLB is a private
employer, the constitutional rights are not directly
implicated. 226 Although the Steele decision implied that a
union's action under their statutory authority constituted
state action, similar contentions have been discredited
under modern standards of state action, unless the state or
221. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 832 (Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45, 51-52 (1974), the
Supreme Court made a similar distinction between a union's ability to waive
collective and individual statutory rights in holding that an employee's
statutory right to a trial under Title VII was not forfeited despite a binding
arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement.
222. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 835 (Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
223. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-80.
224. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 837 (Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); see also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 ('The rights protected by
the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law
of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority."').
225. Bolden, 953 F.2d at 839 (Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
226. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974) (discussing
the "state action" requirement).
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federal government actively participates in the
constitutional violation. 227 Furthermore, not allowing a
union that represents private sector employees to consent to
drug testing would create an anomaly where the private
employer could bargain with employees to agree to random
drug testing, on an individual basis, when the employees
are non-unionized; however, the employer would be
precluded from doing so simply because these private sector
employees have decided to unionize. The NLRA is based on
the belief that individual employees would likely lose their
rights, but, when acting collectively, they are able to fight to
protect their rights. 228 Accordingly, players who oppose
drug testing that the MLBPA agrees to are also without a
remedy. As the foregoing situations show, our legal system
strongly supports unions having wide latitude in
collectively bargaining over a drug testing program.
D. Public Interest and Supra-Government Regulators
The public has expressed a desire for clean sports to
watch and freedom from having to resort to the health risks
of performance-enhancing drugs to compete. 229 To be sure,
parents have a strong interest in the health of their
children and professional athletes often serve as role
models. For example, the father of a child who committed
suicide after abusing anabolic steroids testified to Congress
during the 2005 hearings:
I believe the poor example being set by professional athletes is a
major catalyst fueling the high usage of steroids amongst our kids.
Our kids look up to these guys. They want to do the things the
pros do to be successful .... Our youngsters hear the message loud
227. Id. at 358-59 (holding that actions of private utility did not constitute
state action where the state legislature conferred upon the private utility a
monopoly and extensively regulated the utility); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that no state action existed where the state merely
granted a private club a liquor license).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
229. But see Darryl C. Wilson, "Let Them Do Drugs'"-A Commentary on
Random Efforts at Shot Blocking in the Sports Drug Game, 8 FLA. COASTAL L.
REV. 53 (2006) (arguing against regulation or at least for significant reform that
focuses on education, disclosure of use, and allows performance-enhancing drug
users and non-users to compete against each other, but with a bifurcated award
system).
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and clear, and it's wrong. If you would want to achieve your goal,
it's OK to use steroids to get you there, because the pros are doing
it. It's a real challenge for parents to overpower the strong
message that's being sent to our children by your behavior.
23 0
Moreover, a basic tenet is that participation in sports
will be beneficial to one's health. However, while at least
part of the public has developed a belief that there is no
place for certain performance-enhancing drugs in sports,
such fans do not have the traditional democratic political
process to represent their interests, because MLB is a non-
state actor. 231 These fans could send a message to MLB and
the MLBPA by boycotting games, but they have not done so
effectively. 232
Despite the private autonomy that is an integral part of
our free market society, many legal and political policies
are driven by private individuals and groups who seek to
further their interests and values by taking actions that go
beyond lobbying legislatures. 233 These actors have been
discussed as "supragovernmental regulators."
23 4
230. Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League
Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 118-19 (2005) (statement of Donald M. Hooton,
President & Dir., Taylor Hooton Foundation).
231. Not everyone is in accord and some other commentators have written
in favor of no regulation. See, e.g., Hector Del Cid, Winning at All Costs: Can
Major League Baseball's New Drug Policy Deter Kids from Steroids and
Maintain the Integrity of the Game?, 14 SPORTS LAW. J. 169, 193-94 ("The public
can use erectile function and libido drugs, have plastic surgery to enhance
breast and penile size, and use liposuction to lose fat that a quality diet would
remove and maintain. Then we tell our athletes to perform at superhuman
levels without any means of superhuman recovery .... If clean competition is
what is desired in baseball, the only solution would be a complete ban of any
performance enhancer. A complete ban would mean no pain medication, no
lasix eye surgery, no eye glasses, and no diabetics who take insulin could be a
part of the sport. The question is: How far are we willing to go for clean
competition?").
232. See Press Release, Major League Baseball, Commissioner's Statement
(Dec. 13, 2007), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/press-releases/press-release.jsp?ymd=
20071213&contentid=2325226&vkey-pr mlb&fext=.jsp&cid=mlb.
233. See Abbot & Snidal, supra note 113, at 451.
234. See generally Errol Meidinger, Competitive Supragovernmental
Regulation: How Could It Be Democratic?, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 513 (2008)
(discussing how non-governmental organizations are able to leverage
themselves and establish power).
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Supragovernmental regulators often compete against each
other as well as against state regulatory programs. 235 The
democratic responsiveness and legitimacy of
supragovernmental regulators may be crucial to their
success. 236 One example is the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC).237 By protesting outside of Home Depot Stores 238 and
gaining consumer support, the FSC, an entity devoted to
forestry management and sustainable logging that created
certification standards, forced retailers to sell only lumber
that the FSC certified. The FSC's certification standards
exceeded state forest management regulations, as state
legislatures were subjected to undue political influences
from loggers. 239 Winning over retailers and consumers was
not the only challenge the FSC faced. The FSC also had to
deal with timber companies that were reluctant to apply for
certification due to the autonomy and independence they
would lose while under FSC scrutiny. 240
WADA is one organization that has embraced the belief
that there is no place for certain performance-enhancing
drugs in sports and has placed itself in a position of
authority to police this belief. In 2003, the Chairman of
WADA, Dick Pound, indicated he was considering urging
the IOC to treat the United States as an "international
sports pariah" and to pressure all of the member
federations to remove their international sports
competitions from the United States.241 WADA was upset
over the cut in funding the United States provided to
WADA and by the refusal of professional sports leagues in
the United States to sign the Code. 2 42 As one commentator
notes, it "would probably be more accurate to say that the
American sports leagues did not so much refuse to sign on
to the WADA anti-doping campaign as ignore it
235. Id. at 518-19.
236. Id. at 522-23.
237. See generally id. (discussing the FSC's role as a supragovernmental
regulator).
238. Id. at 525.
239. See Brock Evans, Chop Now, Pay Later, 13 F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB.
POL'Y, Summer 1998, at 18, 18-23.
240. DAVID SuzuKi & HOLLY DRESSEL, GOOD NEWS FOR A CHANGE 18 (2002).




altogether."243 However, U.S. Deputy Director of the Office
of National Drug Control Policy, Scott Burns, foresees
American professional sports leagues signing the Code
someday. 244 Burns stated: "They don't want to sign on right
now, because it's tough and it's specific. And there are
consequences and it can be monitored, and people will be
caught and cheaters will be punished. ' 245 Burns further
believes that American professional sports leagues and
their unions have not signed onto the Code because the
high conviction rate of WADA (ninety-eight percent of the
cases prosecuted by WADA Signatories have resulted in
conviction) creates a perception that the process is
unfair.246 The International Olympic Committee has also
placed similar pressure on MLB. In 2005, the IOC voted to
eliminate baseball and softball from the schedule for the
2012 Olympics. 247 This was the first time a sport was cut
from the Olympics since 1936.248 JOC President Jacques
Rogge has asserted that the decision was partially
influenced by a desire to motivate MLB to improve its anti-
doping policy and to spur MLB to allow its players to
participate in the Olympics. 249 Such contentions have been
discredited as the true motive.
25 0
243. Id.
244. See Eddie Pells, Deputy Drug Czar Sees Day When U.S. Pro Leagues
Will Accept World's Standards, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 20, 2007 (on file with
the Buffalo Law Review).
245. Id.
246. See id. (noting that all cases involving American athletes that the
USADA has brought to arbitration since it was founded in 2000 have resulted
in drug sanctions being upheld).
247. See Alan Abrahamson, IOC Drops Softball, Baseball, L.A. TIMES, July
8, 2005, at D1.
248. See id.
249. See James Mulligan, Rogge: Baseball Still Has Work to Do Before
Olympic Return, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 20, 2006, at 13.
250. See, e.g., Mark Zeigler, Olympic Ax Could Fall Today on Baseball and
Softball, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 29, 2002, at C1 (noting that critics have
asserted it is a matter of European politics, as Europeans traditionally have
dominated the Olympics and are attempting to reestablish their roots). Indeed,
this reasoning also explains why softball was also cut. In addition, the IOC did
not eliminate the NBA, which has an anti-doping policy that many consider to
be considerably weaker than MLB's and which allows its athletes to participate
in the Olympics. Quinn & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 54 (noting that numerous
experts say that the NBA's policy is "effectively useless"). If the IOC wants
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E. Authority of the Government and Supragovernmental
Regulators in the Steroid Controversy
The clashing interests in this situation provide
several different solutions to regulating performance-
enhancing drugs in American professional sports that have
various advantages and disadvantages. The federal
government has two major options. First, it can increase its
criminal investigation efforts under existing laws. In
addition, it can enact legislation that regulates drug testing
in American professional sports. Supragovernmental
regulators, such as WADA, offer a third solution for MLB to
improve its performance-enhancing drug policy and restore
its credibility and trust among fans.
First, instead of having Congress delegate
responsibility to MLB, the U.S. government can increase its
investigatory efforts to fight illegal drug users. If this is an
issue that society wants to control, the entire blame should
not be placed on private actors. Since the BALCO
investigation gets the credit for bringing this issue to the
forefront of our government's attention, continued efforts by
the government to enforce its laws and prevent steroid use
and distribution via the Controlled Substance Act could be
an effective solution. However, the policy of the U.S.
Department of Justice "is to prosecute the manufacturers,
importers, and distributors of performance enhancing
substances, not the athletes who use them. ' 251 It has also
been argued that the Anabolic Steroid Act of 1990 is
perpetuating this problem and needs to be repealed or
significantly revised. 252
During 2008 Congressional hearings, MLB
Commissioner Selig noted that the issue of performance-
enhancing drugs has become a "societal problem" and
clean athletes, it should be happy that MLB does not allow its players, whom
the IOC assumes are doping, to compete in the games.
251. See MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 292.
252. See Rick Collins, The Anabolic Steroid Control Act: The Wrong
Prescription (2005), http://mesomorphosis.com/articles/collins/wrong-
prescription.htm. But see Selig with Manfred, supra note 7, at 36 (discussing
how a lack of federal regulation of nutritional supplements has hurt American
professional sports and, if such substances were regulated by Congress,
American professional sports leagues would be able to address the issue during
collective bargaining).
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neither American professional leagues nor the Olympic
Movement has the legislative authority to address the
problem. 253  Accordingly, Commissioner Selig urged
Congress to consider proposed bills that address the
problem of the widespread availability of controlled
substances on the internet. 254 The MLBPA Executive
Director similarly urged Congress to consider legislation
that requires chemical markers to be placed in prescription
human growth hormone (HGH) so that drug testing is able
to detect it, to consider legislation attacking internet sales,
to investigate other legislation addressing the widespread
availability of these substances, and further requested it to
look into whether the Dietary Supplement Health and
Education Act is being adequately enforced. 255 The point
that steroid use is a societal problem is buttressed by the
fact that studies have shown that teenage girls have
reported increased use of anabolic steroids for body-
enhancing or self-protection reasons, not to improve athletic
performance. 256 During these hearings, Donald Fehr noted:
I don't think it's terribly likely that teenage girls are using
steroids because they want to turn into major league pitchers or to
linebackers. There's got to be something else that's going on there,
where you have a circumstance in which the product seems to be
widely available, easy to find, you have massive advertising, you
have online sales, you have pharmacies that according to the press
reports dispense drugs without individual doctor's examinations.
Those are the kinds of things that no matter what we do, that's the
environment we can't solve.... And I think personally-this is not
a statement on behalf of the players, this is simply a personal
opinion, that if we maintain a culture in which every time a
potential junior high school or high school or potentially college
athlete goes in to see the coach, complete with all the pressures for
scholarships, and the message is, you're just not big enough, you're
just not strong enough, you're just not fast enough, and that
message is repeated ad nauseum, people are going to look for ways
to get bigger and stronger and faster. And that-by the time they
253. Drugs in Sports Hearing, supra note 184, at 9 (statement of Allen H.
Selig, Witness, Comm'r, Office of the Comm'r of Baseball).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 10 (statement of Donald Fehr, Executive Dir., Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n).
256. See id. at 22 (statement of Rep. Michael C. Burgess, Member, H.
Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection).
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get to the pros, whatever message they have in that regard, they
already have. So that's why I suggested in my testimony that we
need some help from the Congress in a lot of these other areas.
And it's going to be tough; you know, it's taken us 40 years to
make meaningful impacts on discouraging tobacco use, but we got
a start. 257
It was also noted that recent studies have indicated that
steroid use by high school students has declined since
2003.258
Next, a more controversial solution that has been
considered is federal legislation that imposes testing
standards for American professional sports. However, while
many people have advocated for federal legislation to
protect 'the integrity of the game,"' it has also been
asserted that "the integrity of our legal system" must not be
compromised.259 It has been asserted that federally
mandated drug testing raises constitutional concerns
related to player privacy rights.260
For practical reasons, federal legislation would likely be
ineffective. Amendments to the legislation would be timely,
costly, and divert governmental resources. In the constant''game" between those who use performance-enhancing
drugs and those who are trying to eradicate the same,
which has been compared to the constant struggle between"cops and robbers, ' 261 the inflexibility of legislation makes
this option inefficient and ineffective.
257. Id. at 22 (statement of Donald Fehr, Executive Dir., Major League
Baseball Players Ass'n).
258. See id. at 32-33 (statement of Robert Kanaby, Executive Dir., Nat'l
Fed'n of State High School Ass'ns).
259. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915,
979 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting in part), withdrawn and reh'g
granted, 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008).
260. Compare Joshua Peck, Note, Last Resort: The Threat of Federal Steroid
Legislation-Is the Proposed Legislation Constitutional?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1777 (2006) (arguing that a form of the proposed legislation would be
constitutional under the "special needs" exception) with Tiffany D. Lipscomb,
Note, Can Congress Squeeze the "Juice" Out of Professional Sports? The
Constitutionality of Congressional Intervention into Professional Sports' Steroid
Controversy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 303 (2008) (arguing that a proposed form of the
legislation would be unconstitutional).
261. See infra text accompanying notes 270-73.
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Furthermore, federal legislation in this area could stifle
the competition for credibility between MLB and WADA by
setting a minimum standard of responsibility for MLB-a
legal shield. MLB could use this standard to avoid scrutiny
and thus become complacent with its policy. While it may
appear beneficial for policymakers with authority to take
action to protect society's interest, this type of action can
have negative impacts in the long-run. 26 2 Even though the
long-run takes time to reach, policymakers often best serve
society by allowing competition to run its course. 263 By
stepping in and imposing their will, policymakers dampen
competition and may set a standard that is flawed, but
society will never realize this because the competition for
better solutions has been shut down.264 Competition
between supragovernmental regulators can play a
significant role in achieving reform.
As the Mitchell Report recognizes, testing programs,
including the system the Olympics has implemented, have
evolved through trial and error. 265 Since drug programs
must be continuously updated to address new problems and
concerns in this continuous struggle between cops and
robbers, competition for legitimacy between American
professional sports and WADA could result in the best
practices evolving more quickly and, hopefully, in a
262. Cf. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496,
507-09 (1989) (discussing how states with inferior corporate codes will only hurt
themselves in the long-run because organizations needing to raise funds will
incorporate in other states where investors are more protected and, therefore,
more willing to invest).
263. See id. at 507-08 ("The long run takes time to arrive, and it is tempting
to suppose that courts could contribute to investors' welfare by eliminating laws
that impose costs in the short run. The price of such warfare, however, is a
reduction in the power of competition among states. Courts seeking to impose
'good' rules on the states diminish the differences among corporate codes and
dampen competitive forces .... Early economic studies may mislead, or judges
(not trained as social scientists) may misinterpret the available data or act
precipitously. Our Constitution allows the states to act as laboratories; slow
migration (or national law on the authority of the Commerce Clause) grinds the
failures under. No such process weeds out judicial errors, or decisions that,
although astute when rendered, have become anachronistic in light of changes
in the economy. Judges must hesitate for these practical reasons-and not only
because of limits on their constitutional competence-before trying to 'perfect'
corporate codes.") (citation omitted).
264. See id.
265. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 258.
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preemptive manner. 266 Some may counter that this has not
happened. However, MLB has responded well to the
criticism and hopefully over time may strive to exceed
WADA's standards-with the appropriate guidance that
this Comment proposes under Part IV. This is especially
true if the marketplace enforces its message for wanting
clean sports by actually acting upon this belief and
boycotting games. Moreover, competition for credibility has
in fact existed between American professional sports
leagues and WADA. For example, these parties have
attacked each other about the validity of their HGH testing,
which has led to significant research and development in
this area. 267 In addition, the National Football League and
the National Football League Players Association have been
diligent in staying ahead of designer steroids, as reflected
when they banned the use of some performance-enhancing
drugs before Congress and the Food and Drug
Administration took action. 268
WADA has gained advocates by providing a competing
policy that has become a benchmark for others to compare
MLB against. Concerns over WADA's legitimacy and MLB's
"sovereignty" have made it difficult for these entities to
reach an agreement. In the end, WADA may prevail
because it is viewed as the "good guy," whereas MLB has
become the "bad guy" for not having an effective anti-doping
policy. If this theory is true, then all MLB players have
been stripped of their presumption of innocence, at least in
266. See id.
267. See infra text accompanying notes 274-79.
268. See Showalter, supra note 2, at 657. According to NFL spokesman Greg
Aiella, the NFL currently works "closely with WADA and USADA in several
ways, but [the NFL] . . . do[es] not expect the full WADA code to be adopted."
Pells, supra note 244. Further, he stated that the NFL believes that its
current policy allows for a tailored approach that addresses the specific
issues relating to professional football. For example, [the NFL has] ...
been able to add new substances to [its] ... prohibited list more quickly
than would be the case under WADA, and [it] . . . can adjudicate
appeals in a more expeditious way.
Id. MLB has also voluntarily relied upon some WADA criteria in administering
its policy. See MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 273, 275.
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the court of public opinion,269 and fans have placed their
interest in the integrity of the game over each player's
individual rights. Therefore, to prove their innocence, MLB
players should be subjected to the vigorous standards of the
WADA Code.
Furthermore, concerns related to the effectiveness of
WADA's testing procedures and the Code's impingement on
fundamental American values call into question whether
society should accept WADA's power to pressure American
professional sports leagues. Some commentators have
argued that "[a]t most, drug testing is a second best
alternative." 270 Drug testing in general, whether conducted
by WADA or MLB, does not appear to be effective. The
historic attitude of athletes who want to use performance-
enhancing drugs has been that 'when . . . [doping
authorities] get a test for that [new doping substance] we'll
find something else. It's like cops and robbers.' ' 271 For
example, some MLB players switched to using HGH
272
when the mandatory drug testing program was
implemented, even though they doubted whether HGH
actually improved performance. 273 American professional
269. See Quinn & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 54 (noting that American
Olympic athlete Dara Torres, who made a return to swimming at the age of 41,
felt compelled to volunteer for the USADA's longitudinal testing pilot program
to prove her innocence, stating "[a]ctually, right now, you're guilty 'til proven
innocent. You have to prove it.").
270. See, e.g., Haagen, supra note 55, at 846. Senator Mitchell recognized
that "no testing program, standing alone, is enough," and quotes another
unnamed expert as stating that "testing only scratches the surface."
Accordingly, the Mitchell Report recommends that MLB establish a
Department of Investigation to work with law enforcement. MITCHELL, supra
note 1, at SR-29, 287-90.
271. Richard H. McLaren, WADA Drug Testing Standards, 18 MARQ. SPORTS
L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (quoting Jan Todd & Terry Todd, Significant Events in the
History of Drug Testing and the Olympic Movement: 1960-1999, in DOPING IN
ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT 65, 69 (Wayne
Wilson & Edward Derse eds., 2001)).
272. The distribution of HGH is regulated under federal law. See 21 U.S.C. §
333(e) (2000); MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 20. While HGH "has never been
approved by the FDA for cosmetic, anti-aging, or athletic performance purposes,
[it is] ... not included with steroids as a Schedule III controlled substance [and,
therefore,] . . . there is no criminal penalty for simple possession of HGH." See
id. at 13 (footnote omitted). However, several states have regulated HGH as a
controlled substance. Id.
273. See MITCHELL, supra note 1, at SR-21.
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sports leagues only test for performance-enhancing drugs
via urine samples-which have been unable to detect
HGH.274 The players unions have refused to allow their
players to be blood tested.275 MLB and the NFL have
worked together to discover viable testing methods for
HGH. 276 In fact, in 2008, MLB and the NFL combined
forces with the United States Olympic Committee as the
key contributors to a four-year, $10 million research
coalition-the Partnership for Clean Competition-with the
goal of establishing more effective and cheaper drug testing
techniques. 277 The utility of WADA's HGH testing has also
come into question, particularly because no athletes have
tested positive during the four years during which it has
been used and research indicates WADA's test can only
detect HGH use within the last twenty-four to forty-eight
hours. 278 Nevertheless, the United States Anti-Doping
Agency (USADA) was adamant during congressional
hearings that its HGH test is effective. 279
As mentioned above, the BALCO investigation
uncovered steroid use that testing was not detecting.
Writers have noted that many athletes implicated in the
BALCO investigation were not athletes of American
professional sports leagues, but were athletes who
repeatedly tested negative under international
274. See McLaren, supra note 271, at 18-19. In 2006, the MLB
Commissioner funded a three year study to develop a urine test for HGH.
MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 275-76. In July 2008, private researchers believed
they discovered a viable urine test for HGH. See A.J. Perez, Detecting HGH Just
the Beginning: Researchers Hope to Create Better Tests for Cancer, USA TODAY,
July 23, 2008, at C8.
275. See Quinn & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 54.
276. Press Release, supra note 232.
277. Juliet Macur, United Antidoping Program is Formed, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 2008, at D5. The United States Anti-Doping Agency, the National
Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and the Professional Golf
Association of America also joined the partnership but did not contribute as
much capital. Id.
278. Amy Shipley, Straight Dope Remains Elusive: Lack of Positive Tests
Seen as Both a Sign Of Progress, Failure, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2008, at D1;
Perez, supra note 274. The Mitchell Report recognized that an approved blood
test for HGH exists, but the practical utility of this test is doubtful. MITCHELL,
supra note 1, at 275-76.
279. Drugs in Sports Hearing, supra note 184 (statement of Travis T.
Tygart, Chief Executive Officer, United States Anti-Doping Agency).
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standards. 280 Criminal investigations were also used to
bring down the Festina cycling team and the East German
doping program-not the international testing that failed to
detect these cases. 281 Thus, some have noted that "WADA is
not definitively more effective in ridding sport of
performance-enhancingdrugs [sic], which warrants a
serious debate about whether the costs associated with this
program are worthwhile in the context of American
professional sports. ' 282 Indeed, another commentator has
compared WADA's methods to witch-hunting.283
Assertions that WADA is not even following the Code
have been raised. For example, there have been some
allegations that WADA has been unfairly attempting to
influence the outcome of conviction proceedings, 284 but the
Code mandates that each athlete should be afforded a fair
and impartial hearing.285 It has also been noted that the
regime that WADA created allows the anti-doping agency to"serve as prosecutor, judge and jury for an athletes' [sic]
case" and that the Code's structure interferes with-or even
denies-an accused's evidentiary discovery rights, 286 which
would likewise undercut the duty to provide a fair and
impartial trial. WADA has created a conviction process
based on a system where everyone must assume WADA is
280. Haagen, supra note 55, at 845-46; Quinn & Fainaru-Wada, supra note
54.
281. Haagen, supra note 55, at 846.
282. Id. (noting invasions of privacy and false positives as significant costs
of WADA).
283. Goldstein, supra note 6, at 152, 169, 172-73.
284. Id. at 170.
285. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 8.1, at 48 (World Anti-Doping Agency
2009).
286. Goldstein, supra note 6, at 171-72 (noting that American cyclist Floyd
Landis "requested documentation on the testing procedures used to find his
guilt. The response received from the USADA stated, 'After extensive review by
us of your voluminous requests, I am writing to inform you that we will not be
providing any documents or other information in response to your requests.'
Yet, there is uncontested proof that the lab that tested the backup sample of
Landis had mistakenly labeled the specimen. Additionally the lab used
admitted problems with computer hackers." (quoting Letter from Travis T.
Tygard, General Counsel of the USADA to Howard L. Jacobs, Attorney for





right. 28 7 There have also have been many challenges to the
scientific reliability of WADA's test procedures. 288 This led
to intense and expensive legal battles. For example, the
United States Anti-Doping Agency spent more than $2
million dollars to establish a conviction and defend against
the athlete's (cyclist Floyd Landis) appeals. 28 9
An additional concern with the Code that has been
raised by the MLBPA is that many substances banned by
WADA can legally be purchased over-the-counter and use of
some of these legal supplements could result in positive
tests for steroids because of the FDA's failure to effectively
regulate nutritional supplements. 290 Thus, Congress could
impose Code-like standards on athletes without fulfilling
obligations under the Code 291-which are presumably
expected of the government because of the strict liability
standard under the Code.
In sum, the court of public opinion appears to have
rendered a judgment against MLB. If MLB does not
voluntarily take action now, the marketplace may
eventually force MLB to turn drug testing over to WADA.
However, it should be noted that the public has not
enforced its decision; MLB revenue and attendance have
continued to increase despite the negative publicity the
league has received. 292 Because of the lingering questions
concerning the utility of drug testing, the Code's
impingement upon fundamental American values and
WADA's despotic mentality, continued competition between
these supragovernmental regulators will encourage both
the American Professional Sports Leagues and WADA to
287. See id. at 174-75 ("The growing perception among athletes... is that
because of lack of discovery, the burden of proof, closed laboratories, immense
legal costs, questions of neutrality among judges, and various other problems, a
fair hearing is very difficult to attain. The procedure is stacked against the
athlete's innocence.").
288. See McLaren, supra note 271.
289. Rogge Against Boycott of Beijing Games, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2008, at
D2. Another barrier to drug testing is that it is also very expensive. Blood
testing can cost between $50 to $1000 per test and it costs approximately $400
to conduct a urine sample. Macur, supra note 277.
290. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 24.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
292. See Press Release, supra note 232.
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fight for legitimacy and, in the process, lead to the further
development of drug testing methods.
IV. WILL SOFT LAW HELP MLB GET TOUGH?
A. Is an Agreement Between MLB and WADA Feasible?
By enacting some form of performance-enhancing drug
policy, MLB and the MLBPA have indicated their intent to
fight the use of these substances in baseball and, thus, they
share a common goal with WADA. Even the MLBPA has
expressed its concern in preventing performance-enhancing
drug use, as the Executive Director, Don Fehr, has
declared: "Simply put, [the] Major League Players
Association does not condone or support the use by players,
or by anyone else, of any unlawful substance .... ,,293 MLB
Commissioner Bud Selig has also noted that the league will
not become complacent by merely adhering to the
recommendations in the Mitchell Report.294
As the Mitchell Report recognizes, there are some
aspects of a drug testing program that the MLBPA has a
strong interest in negotiating over. For example, Senator
Mitchell asserted that
[i]t is likely, and understandable, that the Players Association will
not agree to relinquish authority over the length of penalties to an
independent program administrator. Delegation of that aspect of
the program might not be necessary, however, given that the
penalties now in effect under the joint program are the strongest
of any major professional sports league in the United States.
2 95
293. Restoring Faith in America's Pastime: Evaluating Major League
Baseball's Efforts to Eradicate Steroid Use: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. 307 (2005) (statement of Donald Fehr, Executive
Dir., Major League Baseball Players Ass'n).
294. Press Release, supra note 232 ("As we implement the Senator's
recommendations, we will do even more. We will not rest. Major League
Baseball remains committed to this cause and to the effort to eliminate the use
of performance-enhancing substances from the game.").
295. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 304.
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Due to the MLBPA's interest in-or even duty to-
negotiating these aspects of a drug testing policy, a hard
legalization arrangement with WADA seems improbable at
this point. However, soft law can bring these organizations
and a third-party together. Even if soft law is only
considered a second-best solution, the possibility of soft
legalization would be the starting point for discussions
between WADA and MLB.296 This starting point for
discussion would be critical to the development of both
organizations. As the Chief Forester of a timber company
going through the Forest Stewardship Council certification
process remarked:
[I]t forced me to rub elbows with environmentalists working on
this mutual goal of sustainability; it expanded both our
understanding of each other. At the internal meeting of the Forest
Stewardship Council, who are the certification folks, I sat across
the table with the co-founder of Greenpeace. I never would've done
that! Neither would he! But that way, we were forced to listen to
each other. If people talk face to face, it's amazing what they can
agree on. Any kind of dialogue generates some level of trust. You
have to vent back and forth, but you learn. 297
As far as MLB is concerned, an agreement with WADA
or another party could have significant benefits. Legal
arrangements that reduce self-serving interpretation can
send a message to third parties that an actor's
commitments to a given policy are credible. 298 By signing an
agreement with an outside actor, MLB would be sending a
message to current players, society, and young athletes that
MLB is committed to fighting performance-enhancing
drugs. A legal agreement would also result in a beneficial
combination of resources to develop testing methods and to
educate athletes and the public about the risks associated
with performance-enhancing drugs. In addition, working
with WADA would reduce legal challenges by players.
When a change is made in a drug testing policy or a new
testing procedure is used, an athlete accused of violating
296. See Trubek et al., supra note 116, at 12 (noting that soft law can induce
participation of the least committed actors).
297. SuzuKi & DRESSEL, supra note 240, at 18.
298. See Abbot & Snidal, supra note 113, at 426-27 (noting that the Mexican
government signed NAFTA in part to increase the credibility of its economic
policies in the eyes of foreign investors).
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the policy is likely to challenge the policy.299 If MLB and
WADA work together, such challenges will not have to be
fought as vigorously after one entity successfully
establishes the validity of the procedure.
As far as WADA is concerned, breaking from its
harmonization policy could also be beneficial. As a
supragovernmental regulator, WADA lacks the inherent
authority of most policymakers. Any form of agreement
with MLB would lead to increases in the perception of
WADA's democracy, credibility, and legitimacy.
Furthermore, soft law fosters goal convergence by creating
conditions in which people will steer themselves to reach
the common goal, instead of directly imposing their view,
which may generate hostility. 300
However, signing on to the Code would be impinging on
the relationship between MLB and its players, which is a
significant reason why soft law is commonly used for
employment and social policy issues. 301 Thus, adopting the
Code would have significant "sovereignty costs" for MLB.
The MLBPA is rightfully skeptical about subjecting its
players to the jurisdiction of a non-state actor, which has
engaged in strong arm tactics indicating it is out to get
MLB and which has established procedures that have been
compared to witch-hunting. 302 In addition, MLB and the
MLBPA are governed by their collective bargaining
agreement. There are substantial differences in how drug
testing policies can be implemented in sports that are
subject to collective bargaining and those that are not. 30 3
After all, protection of employee rights is why the NLRA
was established. 304 While it may not be in the best interest
of players to have the union protect the illegal use of drugs,
there are many other considerations and interests the
MLBPA must consider in negotiating a policy. The MLBPA
299. See generally McLaren, supra note 271 (discussing challenges to
various drug testing procedures).
300. Class Discussion with Errol E. Meidinger, Vice Dean, State University
of New York, University at Buffalo Law School, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Sept. 12,
2007).
301. See Trubek et al., supra note 116, at 15.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 241-50, 283-89.
303. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 258.
304. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
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also has a duty to protect the interests, rights, and privacy
of its players, so that the innocent are not stripped of their
rights simply because strong public disdain has arisen. The
Constitution's safeguards-although not directly implicated
in this context-were guaranteed to avoid this type of
tyranny from the majority.30 5 As MLB Commissioner Selig
has noted, "[g]iven that positive drug tests can lead to fines,
suspensions without pay, or both, it is not at all surprising
that unions resist agreements containing broad prohibitions
and requiring extensive testing.' ' 306 Indeed, the MLBPA has
noted "that major league players rely on baseball for their
livelihood while many athletes in Olympic and other sports
do not. ' 30 7 The MLBPA's Executive Director has also noted
that the fact that Congress has decided that "certain
substances are [ ]legal . . . and may be purchased by
children" makes it difficult for the MLPBA to tell players
they have agreed to ban the substance for MLB players and
that is why MLB's "prohibited substance list is pegged to
U.S. law. '30 8
WADA's drive for harmonization also means that other
diversity factors which exist in sports organizations are
ignored. For example, the MLBPA may have a persuasive
argument that a two-year suspension for a ten million
dollar MLB player is much more severe than a two year
suspension for an amateur athlete subjected to the same
mandatory penalty under the Code. 309  Others have
criticized WADA for its "one size fits all" strategy in other
areas, such as the prohibited substance list.310 WADA
305. See Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 837 (1991)
(Nygaard, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
306. Selig with Manfred, supra note 7, at 35. However, bargaining over drug
testing can also be used as leverage in other areas of negotiations. As the
current commissioner of MLB has noted "through collective bargaining, parties
attempt to achieve gains in certain core areas (such as payroll regulation), often
as a trade-off for, or at the expense of, not making ground in other important
areas (such as nutritional supplement regulation)." Id. at 57.
307. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 259.
308. Drugs in Sports Hearing, supra note 184, at 20 (statement of Donald
Fehr, Executive Dir., Major League Baseball Players Ass'n).
309. See Haagen, supra note 55, at 847-48 (discussing that because of the
economic interests of MLB players, a less severe penalty can achieve the same
deterrence level).
310. Goldstein, supra note 6, at 162.
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asserts that the Code's "rules represent the consensus of a
broad spectrum of stakeholders around the world with an
interest in fair sport."' 311 However, the comments from these
various international stakeholders will inevitably conflict
based on the differences in fundamental values each culture
shares. The Open Method of Coordination-as opposed to
harmonization-has worked for the European Employment
Strategy and deserves consideration by WADA.
B. Elements of an Effective Performance-Enhancing Drug
Policy
The importance of "independence" has been highlighted
as an integral part of an effective performance-enhancing
drug policy. Experts have noted that a sports body is often
motivated to protect the public image of its athletes and its
sport by "leniently dealing with violators" when it is able to
govern itself.312 The IOC recognized the benefits of
delegation in making WADA an independent organization.
WADA has been able to use its independence "to garner the
trust and respect of the athletes while exercising its
authority to police the various sports bodies, ensuring that
they are adhering to the Code and complying with their
responsibilities." 313 Travis Tygart, CEO of the USADA, has
promoted the Code because he believes "the checklist of
independence and transparency found in the WADA code
provides for the most effective programs.
'31 4
The Mitchell Report noted that the following
characteristics are widely recognized as essential to an
effective performance-enhancing drug policy: (1)
independence of the program administrator; (2)
transparency and accountability; (3) effective, year-round,
unannounced testing; (4) flexibility so that the program is
responsive to best practices and new challenges as they
develop; (5) respect for player privacy and due process
rights; (6) adequate funding; and (7) a robust education
311. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE introductory cmt. at 18 (World Anti-Doping
Agency 2009).
312. Goldstone, supra note 57, at 365.
313. Id. at 366.
314. Pells, supra note 244.
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program. 315 The Mitchell Report states that "[t]ransparency
is essential to demonstrate the integrity of any drug testing
program" and will help to ensure accountability. 316 The
report views transparency as "disclosure of sufficient
information about the operation of the program to ensure
that it is operated fairly and in accordance with the
expectations of interested parties, including fans. '
317
Transparency can be achieved by issuing periodic reports on
the program's operations and aggregate test results, and by
submitting to regular audits to avoid any tendency for"results management" practices. 318 Article 14 of the Code
attempts to balance "[t]he principles of coordination of anti-
doping results, public transparency and accountability and
respect for the privacy interests of individuals alleged to
have violated anti-doping rules."319 Under the Code, anti-
doping organizations are allowed to publicly disclose the
identity of an athlete alleged to have violated an anti-
doping rule after notifying the athlete or other person of the
alleged violation. 320 Within twenty days of an anti-doping
rule violation conviction, the Anti-Doping Organization is
required to publicly report the disposition of the anti-doping
matter.321 For statistical reporting purposes, under the
Code Anti-Doping Organizations are allowed to publish
reports showing the name of each athlete tested and the
date of the testing.322 The Code further provides:
315. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 262, 305-06. A 2000 Columbia University
commission recommended that drug testing programs include the following
characteristics: (1) administration by a truly independent organization with
broad authority over testing and sanctioning; (2) comprehensive year-round
unannounced testing; and (3) continued research regarding performance-
enhancing drugs and more effective testing methods designed to address
changes in doping techniques. THE CASA NAT'L COMM'N ON SPORTS &
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, THE NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT COLUM.
UNIV., WINNING AT ANY COST: DOPING IN OLYMPIC SPORTS 3-4 (2000).
316. MITCHELL, supra note 1, at 265, 304.
317. Id. at 265.
318. Id. at 265, 304.
319. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE art. 14 introductory cmt. at 84 (World Anti-
Doping Agency 2009).
320. Id. art. 14.2.1, at 86.
321. Id. art. 14.2.2, at 86.
322. Id. art. 14.4, at 88.
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Each Signatory shall establish rules and procedures to ensure that
all Athletes or other Persons under the authority of the Signatory
and its member organizations consent to the dissemination of their
private data as required or authorized by the Code. . . . These
sport specific rules and procedures aimed at enforcing anti-doping
rules in a global and harmonized way are distinct in nature from
and are, therefore, not intended to be subject to or limited by any
national requirements and legal standards applicable to criminal
proceedings or employment matters. When reviewing the facts and
the law of a given case, all courts, arbitral hearing panels and
other adjudicating bodies should be aware and respect the distinct
nature of the anti-doping rules in the Code and the fact that those
rules represent the consensus of a broad spectrum of stakeholders
around the world with an interest in fair sport. 323
However, the Code also requires Anti-Doping
Organizations to comply with applicable data protection
and privacy laws. 324 If forced into an anti-doping policy, the
MLBPA and players may react hostilely and assert rights
under federal and state medical privacy laws to keep
positive test results private. Although players would
become noticeably absent if they were suspended, the public
would never truly know if the player tested positive or
missed games for other reasons. Ultimately, fans and the
media would not get the result they want-knowing who is
cheating.
C. MLB's Soft Law Answer
This Comment proposes that MLB and the MLBPA
agree to be monitored by an independent party that
operates similar to an outside consulting agency. This
organization would have the following responsibilities: (1)
to serve as a mediator to establish goals, benchmarks, and
guidelines for MLB's performance-enhancing drug policy;
(2) to attempt to get the other American professional sports
leagues to join the alliance; (3) to establish a research and
development program to determine emerging trends of
performance-enhancing drug users and develop testing
practices to combat such trends; (4) to propose best
practices to MLB and the MLBPA; (5) to facilitate
323. Id. introduction at 17-18 (italics omitted).
324. Id. art. 14.6, at 89.
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discussions and conferences between WADA, other anti-
doping organizations, and American professional sports
leagues; (6) to periodically meet with MLB and the MLBPA
to review progress towards the goals, benchmarks, and
guidelines; (7) to monitor MLB and the MLBPA's
compliance with the collectively bargained performance-
enhancing drug policy; and (8) to periodically update the
public regarding MLB's compliance. To establish the
relationship, the parties should execute a general
agreement that outlines the mission and vision statements
of the consulting agency and broadly defines its
responsibilities. MLB and the MLBPA should also agree to
make good faith efforts to adhere to the agreement and all
proposals by the consulting agency as a guide during the
collective bargaining process. The agreement should
specifically address terms which MLB and the MLBPA are
allowed to collectively bargain over and whether the
consulting agency will have any rule-making authority.
While this agreement would be non-binding, the
consulting agency would operate similar to accreditation,
seal of approval, and certification organizations. The
benchmarking should be done by establishing a publicly
available rating or "report card" system to compare the
performance-enhancing drug policies in American
professional sports leagues and international sports. Like
the current Independent Program Administrator, MLB and
the MLBPA should not be able to terminate the
relationship unless an independent arbitrator finds
adequate cause to do so. The organization should have a
board of directors composed of representatives from a broad
array of constituencies, such as: fans, league, team, and
player sponsors, medical experts, legal experts, and
amateur athletes. MLB and the MLBPA should agree to
have the initial board of directors selected by an outside
body, such as a congressional committee.
The effectiveness and obligation under this policy will
lie in the consulting agency's ability to make normative
statements and its surveillance of the MLB's program. The
consulting agency's power to report to the public and
mediate discussions between MLB and the MLBPA will
provide it with power similar to Congress's ability to coerce
MLB to improve its policy. One of the reasons
"independence" has become the buzz word for an effective
anti-doping policy is the accountability and scrutiny
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associated with third party review. 325 This is also why "soft
law" can still serve as an effective legal arrangement that
recognizes diversity, despite the apparent flaw that the
commitment is non-binding. As this alliance grows and
other leagues join, the forces of discourse, mimesis,
networking, deliberation, and mutual learning will
facilitate progression. Indeed, true to its athletic and
competitive nature, MLB is proud to say it now has the
most stringent policy of all American professional sports.
This "voluntary" compliance and support of drug testing
may even send a more powerful message to the youth-a
direct message from their role models that there is no place
for performance-enhancing drugs in the sport-which may
be more effective than governmental regulation.
This arrangement would allow MLB and the MLBPA to
continue to negotiate their collective bargaining agreement
while still retaining the benefit of delegation that can create
credibility in the eyes of fans and athletes. As the parties
develop their relationship and learn of the consequences of
such an agreement, they may eventually adopt a harder
form of legalization that provides for even more delegation.
If none of the American professional sports are willing to
agree to such a proposal, this organization could arise
independently by establishing accreditation criteria,
leveraging itself with fans, league, and player sponsors, and
uniting them to pressure MLB and the MLBPA to subject
themselves to the accreditation criteria. 326
325. See SuzuKi & DRESSEL, supra note 240, at 18 (quoting the owner of a
timber company that subjected itself to FSC certification who said: "[W]e found
ourselves being asked some challenging questions by a third party. Then we
started to realize we could do better. It's really revitalized our practices.").
326. See Quinn & Fainaru-Wada, supra note 54 (quoting sports marketing
consultant Marc Gains, who noted "[y]ou may find that for certain sports, this
kind of aggressive drug testing may wind up becoming a standard in all new
endorsements contracts"). This proposed organization may be able to convince
companies who seek athletes for endorsement deals to only accept athletes from
leagues that comply with certain testing standards. Alternatively, they may be
able to convince these companies to provide drug testing clauses in the
endorsement contract. There would be many difficulties and inefficiencies with
having such a clause. First, it would be a particularly decentralized approach
that would be costly for testing and defending against player challenges.
Second, it could drive top athletes to go to the company's competitors. Third,
there would be public relations problems if the player tested positive,
particularly because the company's name would be tied to the positive test in




In conclusion, MLB may find significant benefits in
finally reaching a soft law agreement with another party
that allows it to continue bargaining over the substantive
issues of the performance-enhancing policy. To many
people, this may not be the perfect solution, but it would be
a step in the right direction and it would respect American
values. The compelling reason for signing onto the Code
seems to be the benefits that arise from having an
independent and impartial administrator. This
independence does not have to be to WADA. In fact, it may
be better if another independent agency for American
professional sports leagues is created, so that the
competition between these supragovernmental
organizations drives further advancement and
improvements in the field as the organizations fight for
credibility and legitimacy.
In today's international environment where the world is
flat 327-it may be fitting that even America's pastime is
subject to the jurisdiction of a non-state, international
actor. On the other hand, it seems perverse that MLB
should start singing "for it's one, two, [] strikes, you're out,
[of] the old ball game."328
take performance-enhancing drugs, the success of the player using
performance-enhancing drugs will benefit the competitor. However, the
endorsing company's stance against performance-enhancing drugs could
translate into a competitive advantage. For these reasons, the new drug testing
organization could begin to leverage itself with companies within a particular
market niche where the product or service the player would be endorsing is not
directly linked to athletic performance and the company's consumers are more
committed to the anti-doping campaign than loyalty to athletes. This may be
true for certain types of cereals and health foods that athletes endorse.
327. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005).
328. Cf. JACK NORWORTH, Take Me Out to the Ball Game (York Music Co.
1908).
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